Hollosi Information eXchange /HIX/
HIX HUNGARY 899
Copyright (C) HIX
1997-01-29
Új cikk beküldése (a cikk tartalma az író felelőssége)
Megrendelés Lemondás
1 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  20 sor     (cikkei)
2 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  54 sor     (cikkei)
3 Re: Habsburgs, Constitutions, and Representative Gov't (mind)  62 sor     (cikkei)
4 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  78 sor     (cikkei)
5 FW: The Trouble With Corporatism (mind)  133 sor     (cikkei)
6 One down, many to go... (mind)  28 sor     (cikkei)
7 One down, many to go... (mind)  28 sor     (cikkei)
8 Re: Riding the tiger (mind)  83 sor     (cikkei)
9 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  28 sor     (cikkei)
10 Re: Riding the tiger (mind)  63 sor     (cikkei)
11 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  21 sor     (cikkei)
12 How the Hungarian Lobby Works? (mind)  29 sor     (cikkei)
13 HL-Action: letters to JP Morgan (mind)  72 sor     (cikkei)
14 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  40 sor     (cikkei)
15 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  15 sor     (cikkei)
16 Re: Riding the tiger (mind)  79 sor     (cikkei)
17 Re: World War I (mind)  104 sor     (cikkei)
18 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  11 sor     (cikkei)
19 Re: Riding the tiger (mind)  94 sor     (cikkei)
20 Action on the Csangos (mind)  46 sor     (cikkei)
21 HL-Action: letters to JP Morgan (mind)  72 sor     (cikkei)
22 HABSBURGS II (mind)  92 sor     (cikkei)
23 FW: Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  25 sor     (cikkei)
24 Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind)  26 sor     (cikkei)
25 Re: World War I (mind)  30 sor     (cikkei)
26 Re: HABSBURGS II (mind)  27 sor     (cikkei)
27 Re: The Trouble With Corporatism (mind)  144 sor     (cikkei)
28 Re: Egy kis lecke Szalai Jozsefnek (mind)  15 sor     (cikkei)
29 strings, knots... (mind)  33 sor     (cikkei)

+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

George Antony wrote:

"The example of South Tyrol has been occasionally raised by me and others,
just to sink without a trace immediately."

As stated  clearly in my original letter,  I am in favor of  this solution.
But you seem to forget that (notice; no comma!) the South-Tyrolians did not
get it as a x-mas present. They had to fight for it hard and long. Not to
mention the Basques, and the  Catalans.  Even the Jura-French in
Switzerland had to blow up a few  objects,  in a very civilized  Swiss
manner of course.

In the light of these well-known facts, how do you propose to achieve the
same deal for the Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania, Voivodina and in the
Ukraine?

If you come up with a workable idea, about four million  Hungarians will be
indebted to you for ever.

 Magyarody
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

S.J. Magyarody wrote:

> the international treaties are worth only as much, as the price of paper
> they are printed on. Since - contrary to popular believe - there is no
> "international law" as such, the only law is the force of arms, no matter,
> how you slice it.
> Besides; treaties, agreements are not valid, if they are signed under duress.

A uniquely interesting viewpoint.

I am ready to make the concession, though, that if a country has the necessary
force, and the stomach to use it, she can flout any international treaty.

> I agree with you that our only hope is the "South Tyrol
> solution", not to mention the Aaland Islands, the Catalan, the Basque, the
> Swiss, Gagauz (Moldavia) solutions. But, we will never get it simply by
> asking for it. You have to raise the stakes. Otherwise you have no
> bargaining chips in your hands.

The trouble with this argument is that it is clear to any objective observer
that Hungary has NO bargaining chips as it stands.  There is no point in
stirring up fear of a war for regaining territory (for this is the only way
of raising the stakes) when Hungary is neither prepared for nor, I would
suggest, willing to start and see through a war against the combined Little
Entente.

War was the Serbian approach to dispute resolution.  They started by raising
the stakes, as you suggest, and showed that they were not bluffing when the
bluff was called.  They also started from a military position much more
favourable than Hungary could ever dream of, and where did it get them ?
A ruined country in a ruined region, hundreds of thousands of Serbs chased
from their ancestral lands, ten of thousands of Serbs dead, the mother country
still no bigger but bankrupt, disaffected and internationally despised.  The
only 'gain' to point to is an unviable and unrecognized statelet that is being
deserted by anybody who can hack it elsewhere in the world.

Would any Hungarian want to contemplate such an outcome to 'solve' the problem
of Hungarian minorities ?

> This is my letter to the Times, the one they will never print:
> ...
> The problem  was swept under the rug again. It could only  be solved by
> rearranging the borders,  in such a way, that an equal number of minorities
> will live on both sides of the border.  Then, and only then,  would it be
> possible the economic, cultural, political and military integration of the
> region with Western Europe.

Do you really mean this or is this part of 'raising the stakes' ?

George Antony

PS: Unlike for 'hogy' in Hungarian, in English there is no comma preceding
    'that'.  This error tends to mar otherwise sophisticated English writings
    by Hungarians.  Prof. Liptak has the same problem.
+ - Re: Habsburgs, Constitutions, and Representative Gov't (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Hugh Agnew wrote in a response to my question about constitutions and
representative/elected government in Austria (where I ment the 'non-
magyar' part of the empire):

>Simple: constitutional and representative government was promised to all
>the peoples of the monarchy by imperial manifesto in March, 1848, a draft
>constitution for the non-Hungarian parts of the monarchy was produced in
>April, provoked violent protest demonstrations and was later replaced
>(after the court had fled to Innsbruck), and the revised constitution
>formed the basis for elections held in June & July, the Constitutional
>Reichsrat held its first session in August, 1848.

and also:

>expressions of that multi-nationality would have to be.  Except for the
>stillborn constitutional draft produced by the Reichsrat after it had
>moved to Kremsier (Kromeriz) in Moravia and that died with it in March,
>1849 with the octroi of the Stadion constitution.

In other words "On March 4, Francis Joseph dissolved the Austrian Reichstag,
then sitting in Kremsier (Kromeriz) in Moravia, and promulgated a new consti-
tution, known as the Stadion or 'octroyed' constitution. It was a mixed piece
of legislation, remarkably liberal with respect to civil rights, municipal
self-government, and national equality, but also highly centralist and
absolutist." (Sugar P.F.,Hanak P., Frank T., A History of Hungary)

What followed the new constitution was also a mixture:

"The centralizing, Germanizing new Austria was, at the same time (i.e 1850s),
a civic state, which retained the basic achivements of the bourgeois
revolution: the freeing of the serfs, the legal equality of citizens,
and proportional taxation. The government placed middle-class specialists into
offices previously occupied by elected officials and attempted to separate
consistently administrative and judicial functions." (Sugar et al.)

and:

" ...Only the centralized empire became a reality: a bureaucratic-military
state based on informers, spies, and a police system that concerned itself
with the smallest details of everyday life." (Sugar et al.)

This remained the situation till the late 1850s, early 1860s (the October
Diploma, and February Patent which was the first attempt to create an
imperial parliament since 1849). The main reasons for these 'constitutional
experiments' were the failures of the centralized absolutism in solving
the financial problems and crisis in foreign policy.

So this is what I found about the 'non-magyar' part of the Empire. To
me this shows that there was a very influental cirle at the court,
represented by the generals like Radetzky, Windisch-Graetz and Jelacic
and high-ranking burocrats who was strongly against constitutional
monarchy and prefered a 'felvilagosult' abspolutist state. They got
the upper-hand by the end of 1848 and successfully eliminated most
of the constitutional institution everywhere in the imperium by
1849.
So I think the Hungarian government had every reason to worry and
don't trust the court, although, with the attempts to create an
army independent from the imperial one and have separate budget
probably helped a lot to the conservatives to gain the upper hand
at the Court.

J.Zs
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Kedves George & Listmembers!

At 15:22 29/01/97 +1000,  George wrote:
>S.J. Magyarody wrote:
>
>> the international treaties are worth only as much, as the price of paper
>> they are printed on. Since - contrary to popular believe - there is no
>> "international law" as such, the only law is the force of arms, no matter,
>> how you slice it.
>> Besides; treaties, agreements are not valid, if they are signed under duress
.
>
>A uniquely interesting viewpoint.

It is true that a contract which otherwise appears to be valid can be voided
if one proves that it was signed as a result of someone holding a gun to
one's head.
>
>I am ready to make the concession, though, that if a country has the necessary
>force, and the stomach to use it, she can flout any international treaty.
>
>> I agree with you that our only hope is the "South Tyrol
>> solution", not to mention the Aaland Islands, the Catalan, the Basque, the
>> Swiss, Gagauz (Moldavia) solutions. But, we will never get it simply by
>> asking for it. You have to raise the stakes. Otherwise you have no
>> bargaining chips in your hands.
>
>The trouble with this argument is that it is clear to any objective observer
>that Hungary has NO bargaining chips as it stands.  There is no point in
>stirring up fear of a war for regaining territory (for this is the only way
>of raising the stakes) when Hungary is neither prepared for nor, I would
>suggest, willing to start and see through a war against the combined Little
>Entente.

No, but Hungary does have the option of *educating* the otherwise woefully
ignorant Americans (Al Gore, for example) about the events of the past
hundred years or so, thus hopefully enlisting their sympathy and their
influence on the side of the angels, as it were. That seems to be the aim of
the Hungarian Lobby, and it does seem, from what I have seen to be making
some inroads, some dents in the otherwise thick skin of American ignorance.

>War was the Serbian approach to dispute resolution.
<snip snip>

>Would any Hungarian want to contemplate such an outcome to 'solve' the problem
>of Hungarian minorities ?

Well, let alone the fact that even revanchist Hungarians don't seem to be
contemplating war as a realistic option, I would suggest that this is not
the time to be upping the rhetorical ante with the Romanians, at least, not
now that a relatively reasonable democratic regime seems to be in place
there for the first time. I would favor continued negotiations and
discussions on matters of mutual concern. If the Hungarians don't give
bilateral diplomacy a real chance to work, the Romanian population may be
inclined to return to a more narrowly chauvinistic regime in response. This
would surely be the worst development from the Hungarian point of view.

<snip again>

>George Antony
>
>PS: Unlike for 'hogy' in Hungarian, in English there is no comma preceding
>    'that'.  This error tends to mar otherwise sophisticated English writings
>    by Hungarians.  Prof. Liptak has the same problem.

BTW, the situattion vis-a-vis Slovakia would seem to call for more
high-pressure tactics than Romania at present, but this can be done, as
appears to be being done, by the process of educating the international
community and then exerting the pressure of that international community on
the Slovakian regime (withholding membership in Nato and the EU for example,
or tying acceptance into such international organanizations to progress in
treatment of the minorities.)

Tisztelettel,

Johanne/Janka
Johanne L. Tournier
e-mail - 
+ - FW: The Trouble With Corporatism (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Joe Szalay wrote:

>The ideology that dominates our age is not democracy, socialism, capitalism,
>or communism, but "corporatism".  By corporatism I mean the development of
>large groups - not just big business and corporations but bureaucracies and
>interest groups of all kinds - that try to impose their agenda on society
>and subvert the loyalties of their members from the common good.

>Corporatism reduces civilization to the sum of its corporations, to the sum
>of its interests.  And in the process it becomes a profound denial of
>everything that is actually positive in our history.

>Corporatism everywhere is fundamentally anti-democratic.  Its drive to
>dominance produces weak governments, frayed social safety nets, an ignorant
>workforce, a degraded environment, and a culture in which the individual is
>defined as a consumer or an employee.  Even in government offices citizens
>are now described as "customers" or "clients".  All of these are stages in
>the destruction of civilization.

>And why have we been reduced to being merely customers or clients?  The
>reason is because we've accepted that the basic language of public discourse
>is a language which denies the possibility of the public good.  A language
>which de-legitimizes the democratic state and the role of citizens.  And if
>you accept that language, and it seems that most people do, then you are in
>effect committing suicide.

>If you, as a citizen, allow your government to talk to you about customer
>services, then it's all over.  There's nothing left to discuss.  You
>shouldn't even bother to vote.  Because if you can't get the language right,
>if you allow them to describe you and the public interest in a language
>which denies the public interest, the debate is over.

>Getting the language right is as critical as finding the time to participate
>as a citizen.  Democracy is language and participation.

>Language and participation are tied to the idea of rejecting false
>individualism.  The idea that reigns today - that individualism is walking
>away from society as opposed to participating in society.  That
>individualism is the freedom not to be there - to go on holiday, to go
>skiing - when in fact individualism is about participation and obligation.
>The more you participate, the more you're an individual.

>That's how a real democracy, a humanist democracy is built.  Perhaps you're
>more interested in the Super Bowl.

>I'm sorry if the above ideas seem a bit disjointed.

>Joe Szalai

Hello Joe,
I percieved these paragraphs as a very useful contribution.

At least around here - in Europe -, there are theories floating around coming
from the reflection about systems and comimg to similar conclusions ( with a
possibly different explication of the mechanisms ). A simplified summary :
1) ( social ) systems ( clubs, unions, corporations, families, schools, politi-
   parties, churches, nations, governments,...) are created with an - at least
   implicit - scope, an objective, e.g. coping with complexity.
2) As soon as created, a systems forgets the original scope ( except for celeb-
   rations, inaugurations, anniversaries, what Germans call Sonntagsreden
   ( Sunday speaches ), and automaticaly replaces it with two new ones ( auto-
   poiesis of systems )
   a) survival and stabilization of the very system
   b) external and internal expansion of the system.
      External expansion appears to me to be obvious. Systems >try to impose
      their agenda on society<, to say the least...by manipulation, subversion,
      invasion, what you have.
      The trend to internal expansion, which is inavoidable according to the
      theory, is something  worth watching : it is the continuous open and
      covert attempt, to extend mental and physical control of the members of
      the system. It is not necessary for the "system-agents" doing this to be
      explicitely aware of this process.
3) a system must have a set of "values" - of which normes and rules are
   derived from. It is necassary for the viability of the system that there
   is a sufficient number of individual members having internalized its
   values, norms and rules.
4) since the - external and internal - environment of the system is subject
   to continuous changes, it is vital for the system to adapt. For adaption,
   exchange if information is necessary with the "outside" of the system.
   But exactly because of the autopiesis the system, and the system
   agents - in part aggressively - resist it. ( The form of aggressive re-
   sistence can take also the form of the aggressive wording. See also Agnew4s
   excellent contribution, I very much enjoyed ). Individuals constructively
   thinking against the system, bringing in new ideas from the "outside" of
   the system, trying to reform it from the inside are heretics, called
   enemies oppressed, excommunicated or anihilated ( liquidated is the modern
   term, I think ), albeit the fact that they are only declared illoyal : they
   are very the chance of the system to adapt and, thus, survive.
5) Along with values, norms and rules, the system has an own ( subset of )
   LANGUAGE ( Sprachspiel ) mirroring AND ( >...the basic language of public
   discourse ...which denies the possibility of the public good. < )influencing
   them.

This model, my summary, I am afraid - having spent most of my time as an
engineer and executive ( as such, very unprecise per se ) - is neither complete
nor very accurate. For me at least, it helps to explain a lot of perceptions,
whether in socialism or in capitalism...

The problem, these days, appears to be the perception that our megasystems
( "society" ) some time ago ceased to transfer value systems - including the
insight that it is better for all members of a system if there is a not to smal
l
degree of solidarity, if there an internalization of "common good" as value - t
o
the following generations. Possibly due to the lack of regeneration, refreshing
,
we became emancipated of them...The glue was gone. There is vacuum instead. At
this stage, systems would collapse, implode. From this angle of view the Soros
article can be just on sign ( on the wall ).

Fortunately, I think, what they called the "camp of socialism" collapsed faster
than our system. This might give us the chance to influence the shaping of a ne
w
value system in a direction which is humane and which doesn4t descard the entir
e
heritage as refuse...

>Democracy, n.:
>        A government of the masses.  Authority derived through mass
>meeting or any other form of direct expression.  Results in mobocracy.
>Attitude toward property is communistic... negating property rights.
>Attitude toward law is that the will of the majority shall regulate,
>whether it is based upon deliberation or governed by passion,
>prejudice, and impulse, without restraint or regard to consequences.
>Result is demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, anarchy.
>                -- U. S. Army Training Manual No. 2000-25 (1928-1932),
>                   since withdrawn.
>
( Hey, this is interesting! This was the democracy Mr. Wilsons troops died for
and brought to Versaille, Trianon and what you have? ).

Regards
Miklos
+ - One down, many to go... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear Colleagues,

It seems that we have won this one, but there is a long road ahead. The next
step is a formal hearing with the Vice President. Keep sending your letters.
Best regards: Bela Liptak
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
hd: Budapest, 28 January (MTI) - The Danube barrage to be built near
Esztergom is not a topic of the Hungarian-Slovak expert talks. The aim
of the separate talks is to explore chances of an out-of-court
settlement in the Hungarian-Slovak dispute about the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage, now before the International Court of
Justice in The Hague, Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said in
Gyor (W Hungary) on Tuesday, at a press discussion.

Stressing the confidential nature of the talks, the foreign minister
said the sides have agreed they would not make anything public, in
order not to worsen their positions in The Hague.

No written protocol was compiled from the talks, which is why
parliamentary opposition demands to make these public mean nothing.

Kovacs said the advantage of a separate agreement is that it would be
speedier and less costly than court proceedings.

Kovacs denied opposition claims that the government had side-stepped
Parliament by holding the expert talks. The foreign minister said no
consent is needed from Parliament for holding exploratory talks at
expert level.
+ - One down, many to go... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear Colleagues,

It seems that we have won this one, but there is a long road ahead. The next
step is a formal hearing with the Vice President. Keep sending your letters.
Best regards: Bela Liptak
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
hd: Budapest, 28 January (MTI) - The Danube barrage to be built near
Esztergom is not a topic of the Hungarian-Slovak expert talks. The aim
of the separate talks is to explore chances of an out-of-court
settlement in the Hungarian-Slovak dispute about the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage, now before the International Court of
Justice in The Hague, Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said in
Gyor (W Hungary) on Tuesday, at a press discussion.

Stressing the confidential nature of the talks, the foreign minister
said the sides have agreed they would not make anything public, in
order not to worsen their positions in The Hague.

No written protocol was compiled from the talks, which is why
parliamentary opposition demands to make these public mean nothing.

Kovacs said the advantage of a separate agreement is that it would be
speedier and less costly than court proceedings.

Kovacs denied opposition claims that the government had side-stepped
Parliament by holding the expert talks. The foreign minister said no
consent is needed from Parliament for holding exploratory talks at
expert level.
+ - Re: Riding the tiger (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Eva Balogh writes:

 Although I have not been able
>to locate the full texts of these "diplomas" as they were called, I did
>manage to find descriptions of them.

If you do, please let me know, I am hunting for them also. particularly for
after
the 15th century, i.e. the Habsburg times.

 . And we all know that the interpretation of even written
>constitutions is not always clear-cut and therefore, I am almost certain
>that the Hungarian nobility had a very different interpretation of its own
>privileges and the constitution from that of the king and his advisors.

As well as the Habsburg rulers had a different interpretation from that of
the nobility. It was a two way street.


>>The choice always existed, that the particular Habsburg felt so
>>socially responsible to all of the people of the Hungarian crown, that he
>>could have said, to the hell with the whole thing, I am not going to take
>>the oath because it maintains a socially unacceptable system, and if
>>consequently I loose the country so what. But generally sooner or later most
>>of them took the oath and most of them then proceeded to violate it.
>
>        As far as I know there was only one who didn't: Joseph II.
>
He is the cause for writing "most" although there was a "come to Jesus" act
near his death. It is legally murky at the end of his life.

>        Hungary's separate status, although not completely, but in large
>measure also remained intact due to the tenacity of the country's nobility.
>Whether it was for the good of the country or not in the long run, is a
>question on which we Hungarians obviously don't see eye to eye. The great
>majority, Jeliko included, clings to the idea that the nobles' interests
>were identical the country's interests.

I am fully capable of expressing my beliefs and if necessary cling to them.
I have never said that the noble's interests were identical to the country's
interests, because I disagree with that tenet. What I am arguing is that the
Habsburg interests were not identical with the country's interests.

>I am on the other side.

           That is what I am afraid of and therefore, keep up the argument
on the issue.

>I see the Hungarian nobility's role in a less favorable light. I see that
often it was
>the ruler who protected the the commoners--the serfs--from the nobility
>against the "nation's" wishes. Some of this protection was done actually
>"unconstitutionally."

You are generalizing too much. I am arguing for the welfare of the nation in
toto, not only that of the nobility. (I am aware of the use of the
terminology on a legal basis.)
Yes, it is correct that, at times, the Habsburgs were promoting ideas which
were more progressive than what the nobility was willing to accept. But most
often such promotion was made for keeping the nobility in check and not
because the welfare of the serfs was imperative to the Habsburgs.


> As I said earlier, the Czech nobility was crushed at
>the beginning of the seventeenth century; the Hungarian nobility was
>obviously stronger and the Habsburgs never managed to crush them completely.
>Time and time again there were repeated compromises between the crown and
>the nobility and thus the Hungarian nobility survived with all its political
>power until 1945!! Was it a good thing? I am not sure.

No it was not a good thing. But a part of the responsibility for that is the
willingness of the Habsburgs to compromise with the nobility time after
time. And a reason for that compromise was their perception that the support
of the nobility was needed to keep them in power.

However, for clarity, I would like to stress that neither side is blameless
for many of the events. While to the Habsburgs, the survival of magyars, as
such, was not a goal, as a matter of fact, many of their acts indicates that
they would have been happy to have anybody else populating their realm than
the magyars. This part of their activity is what was detrimental for the
future of the country.

Regards,Jeliko.
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

George Antony writes:

>Given that both Austria and Italy are EU members, and both Hungary and her
>neighbours are clamouring to get into the EU, perhaps South Tyrol should
>be the object of Hungarian PR efforts.  Some sort of Austro-Italian
>involvement, under the aegis of the EU, in the issue of the conditions of
>Hungarian ethnic minorities would set better parameters and provide a greater
>incentive than a US administration that is fundamentally uninterested in
>ethnic rights and whose objectives in the region are limited to preventing
>armed conflict and facilitating US influence-buying.  It would offer Italy
>and Austria an opportunity of grand-standing within the EU and internationally
,
>and it is likely to attract some sympathetic interest, perhaps even support,
>from Russia that is in a situation similar to Hungary's.
>
>Now, I understand that getting such a scheme going is the job of the
>Hungarian government and not of the USAian Hungarian Lobby.  What I would
>like to see, however, is the USAian Hungarian Lobby leaving the door open to
>approaching the issue of Hungarian ethnic minorities with arguments somewhat
>more modern and positive than ritualistic hints, or references, to Trianon.

I would like to second or third this type of proposition. Hmm, who is the
Hungarian delegate to the European parlament, which could be a platform for
this issue?
I think we can gain more from the vanity of Italy and and Austria to help.
Hmm, please don't set up the commission in Vienna.

Regards,Jeliko.
+ - Re: Riding the tiger (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 12:27 PM 1/29/97 +1000, George Antony wrote:

>Eva Balogh wrote:
>> the Hungarian nobility survived with all its political
>> power until 1945!!
>
>I think some qualification would be in order.  While the aristocracy did
>retain much of its political power, the same cannot be said of the lowest
>rung of nobility (literally translated from the Hungarian, the 'small' or
>'common' nobility, perhaps the English squire is closest ?) beyond the
>right to prance about in funny clothes on special occasions.

        Perhaps the word "gentry" would be in order here. There was always a
huge difference between the "fo"u'rak," members of the upper mobility, and
the masses of unentitled nobility, "kisnemesek." The latter is often called
"he'tszilvafa's nemesek," because their parcel of land was only big enough
to grow seven plumb trees! Of course, that was an exaggeration but the fact
was the many, many nobles had no land at all by the nineteenth century while
some didn't live any better than an ordinary peasant. A contemporary
Hungarian historian, whose work I like very much, found some harsh words for
the Hungarian custom of dividing the land among all the children as opposed
to the English custom, where the second and third sons had to fend for
themselves in the professions or in the church.

        By and large I agree with what George had to say above, except I
would emphasize the importance of the gentry in Hungary's political and
social life. In some ways, we are still under the influence of that gentry
mentality.

        But let's start with the gentry's role in politics, which we
shouldn't underestimate. I happen to have a book (the xerox of, to be
precise) in front of me, entitled *Magyar politikai lexikon (Magyar
politikusok): 1914-1929." It is a biographical dictionary of Hungarian
politicans between those two dates. Let's start with the A-s: Abraham Dezso,
dr. (pattantyus), Aigner Karoly, dr., Albrecht kiralyi-herceg, Aldasy Jozsef
dr., Alfoldi Bela dr. (nemes-milititsi), Algya-Pap Sandor, Almasy Denes grof
(zsadanyi es torokszentmiklosi), Almasy Imre grof dr. (zsadanyi es
torokszentmiklosi), Almasy Laszlo dr, Almasy Pal grof (zsadanyi es
torokszentmiklosi), Almasy Sandor, Almay Oliver, Ambrozy Gyula grof (se'deni
es remetei), Ambrozy Lajos grof (se'deni es remetei), Ambrozy-Migazzi Istvan
grof, Ambrus Sandor (varadvelencei), . . .[I am leaving out all the
Andrassys] Angyan Bela dr. (vorosberenyi), Antal Geza dr. (felsogelleri).
Etc. etc. etc. Thus, even a name like dr. Bela Angyan, on the surface
nothing terribly noble about, was actually "vorosberenyi." The county, city
governments were also full of members of the gentry as well as the central
administration.

        While in other countries the nobility acquired the values of the
middle class by becoming middle-class themselves in Hungary the middle class
tried to imitate the ways of the gentry in life style, in dress, in spelling
their names, in calling each other "brother this and brother that."


>> Was it a good thing? I am not sure.
>
>I am sure that it was not.  It has distorted the country's political direction
>and limited its political elite, in addition to the economic and social
>distortions caused by the latifundia.

        Of course, I know that it wasn't. I just wanted to be polite. In
fact, I think it was a tragedy!

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 09:52 AM 1/29/97 +1000, George Antony wrote:

>Bela Liptak wrote:

>> This treaty is only a promise. Hungary carried out her part of the deal, she
>> traded land, - an area equal to her present size - for a promise.
>
>With due respect for Prof. Liptak's untiring efforts in the Hungarian Lobby,
>I think that the claim that "Hungary ... traded land" is quite counter-
>productive.

        I have been convinced for a very long time that Hungarian
politicians, by and large, don't quite know how to approach the politicians
and public of other countries. This was true in 1920 at the peace conference
and unfortunately it is true now.

        Many of the letters which are written to government agencies or
newspapers convey the wrong message and therefore most likely they will
remain ineffectual.

        Eva Balogh
+ - How the Hungarian Lobby Works? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear Colleagues,

There are three Hungarian lists originating from the University of Maryland
and made available to us by Gotthard:

HAL is a general discussion list,

HL serves ONLY to debate the options for Hungarian Lobby actions and

HL-ACTION: provides one form letter/day, which the Hungarian Lobby has agreed
on and recommends that you send under your name

HAL takes about 60 minutes, HL about 10 minutes and HL-ACTION 5 minutes a day
of your time, yet it is HL-ACTION, which brings ALL THE RESULTS.

To sign up to any of these lists, please address an e-mail to:



And in the message write:

subsctibe hl-action

subsribe hl

or for HAL:
subscribe hungary

Best regards: Bela Liptak
+ - HL-Action: letters to JP Morgan (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

****************** CALL FOR ACTION ****************

Priority:
   urgent

Background:
   According to a statement of  the Vice President of  J.P. Morgan
from last year the bank received assurances from the Water Development
Enterprise of Slovakia that none of the loans it lead manag for this
company was spent on the Gabcikovo dam.
   In November, 1996, Miroslav B. Liska, an employee of the Water
Development Enterprise of Slovakia, indicated that the company has
received a loan for end building of Gabcikovo by a group of banks
headed by J.P. Morgan.

What to do:
    Please send a letter to the Vice President of J.P Morgan and
protest. Feel free to use the attached letter written by S.J. 
Magyarody. The letter compares the failures of the Army Corps of 
Engineers with the Gabcikovo project. 
  REMEMBER WE HAVE ONLY 6 WEEKS LEFT TO ACT. PLEASE HELP!! EVERY 
LETTER COUNTS!!

Fax 212-648-5210

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


Margaret W. Southerland              January 29, 1997
Vice President
J.P. Morgan
60 Wall Street
New York, N.Y. 10260-0060

RE: Loan to Slovakia

Dear Mrs. Southerland,

   According to a statement of your bank from July 1996 J.P. Morgan
received assurances from the Water Development Enterprise of Slovakia
that none of the loans you manage for this company will be spent
on the Gabcikovo dam.

   On the 26th of November, 1996, Miroslav B. Liska, an employee of the
Water Development Enterprise of Slovakia, indicated that the company
has received a loan to end the building of Gabcikovo by a group of banks
headed by J.P. Morgan.

   Mrs. Southerland, did J.P. Morgan manage the loan for the
completion of the Gabcikovo project? In this case, your bank did not
only neglect the warnings of numerous environmental activists who
recognized this project as environmentally disastrous and illegal, 
but J.P. Morgan also acted contrary to its statement from July
1996. Please clear this up.

   I would like to remind you that the Gabcikovo project  did the Danube
("Szigetkoz" region) exactly, what the  Corps of Engineers  did to the
Florida  wetlands.  After spending hundreds of millions of  dollars on
draining  the wetlands, straightening out of rivers with costly dams,
they have realised, that the watertable, so important to the  State,
was lowered and polluted.  Now they are spending hundreds of millions
of  dollars, to put back the  system to its original,  natural  state.

   If your experts did not explain this to you,  they did a very costly
disservice to you and your company.

   Surly, you will not  back an ecological and  financial disaster, like
the Slovakian  project. Or would you?

Sincerely

your name, title, address
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In article >, George Antony
> writes:

>Given that both Austria and Italy are EU members, and both Hungary and
her
>neighbours are clamouring to get into the EU, perhaps South Tyrol should
>be the object of Hungarian PR efforts.  Some sort of Austro-Italian
>involvement, under the aegis of the EU, in the issue of the conditions of
>Hungarian ethnic minorities would set better parameters and provide a
greater
>incentive than a US administration that is fundamentally uninterested in
>ethnic rights and whose objectives in the region are limited to
preventing
>armed conflict and facilitating US influence-buying.  It would offer
Italy
>and Austria an opportunity of grand-standing within the EU and
>internationally,
>and it is likely to attract some sympathetic interest, perhaps even
support,
>from Russia that is in a situation similar to Hungary's.
>
>

I like what you're proposing, especially since it would, for a change,
disrupt the EU's predisposition toward serving the foreign policy aims of
France and Germany at the expense of the rest of the continent. Do you
think the Italians and Austrians are up to it? The latter part of your
sentence about the U.S. administration is knee-jerk, anti-American
hogwash. Yes, we sent our soldiers to the former Yugoslavia to prevent
armed conflict. No, the current administration doesn't have enough
foresight to busy itself "buying" influence in the region. The way the
political situation is on the ground right now, there isn't anyone in a
position in the Balkans to be selling said commodity anyway. Why spoil an
otherwise cogent argument with such Cold War claptrap? You're not Joe
Szalai, y'know.
Sam Stowe

"Those who serve the revolution
plow the sea..."
-- Simon Bolivar
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Eva Balogh wrote:
>
>        I have been convinced for a very long time that Hungarian
>politicians, by and large, don't quite know how to approach the politicians
>and public of other countries. This was true in 1920 at the peace conference
>and unfortunately it is true now.

You are right - unfortunately.  And in those times there were a few
diplomats yet, who  had some Ballhaus Platz  experience.  Look at them now!
Their only experience  is in pleasing the  "Great Powers", formerly the
Soviet Union, presently the USA.

Propaganda? It simply does not have any tradition on Hungary.

Magyarody
+ - Re: Riding the tiger (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 11:08 AM 1/29/97 -0500, Jeliko wrote:

>I am fully capable of expressing my beliefs and if necessary cling to them.
>I have never said that the noble's interests were identical to the country's
>interests, because I disagree with that tenet. What I am arguing is that the
>Habsburg interests were not identical with the country's interests.

        "Country." This is a very vague term here. Country? The Magyars of
the country? The nobles of the country? The peasants of the country? My
feeling that under "country" you mean the Hungarian nation in the modern sense.

>>I am on the other side.
>
>           That is what I am afraid of and therefore, keep up the argument
>on the issue.

        Why are you afraid of it? In fact, it is absolutely useless to argue
about this whole issue because you and I, being approximately the same age,
have had enough time to reflect on these matters. We came to entirely
different conclusions and it is most unlikely that we will convince each
other of anything, considering that both of us know the facts pretty well.


>Yes, it is correct that, at times, the Habsburgs were promoting ideas which
>were more progressive than what the nobility was willing to accept. But most
>often such promotion was made for keeping the nobility in check and not
>because the welfare of the serfs was imperative to the Habsburgs.

        It really doesn't matter what their motivations were. The important
thing is the outcome.

>> As I said earlier, the Czech nobility was crushed at
>>the beginning of the seventeenth century; the Hungarian nobility was
>>obviously stronger and the Habsburgs never managed to crush them completely.
>>Time and time again there were repeated compromises between the crown and
>>the nobility and thus the Hungarian nobility survived with all its political
>>power until 1945!! Was it a good thing? I am not sure.
>
>No it was not a good thing. But a part of the responsibility for that is the
>willingness of the Habsburgs to compromise with the nobility time after
>time. And a reason for that compromise was their perception that the support
>of the nobility was needed to keep them in power.

        Here now you are really getting into some very serious logical
problem. You are talking on both sides of your mouth. On the one hand, you
blame the Habsburgs for trying to curb the rights of the nobility which, for
all practical purposes, meant the right of the country in those days, while,
on the other hand, you blame them for not being ruthless enough and crush
them like flies. By the way, my feeling is that if they really wanted to
crush them like flies they could have. Obviously, they were not ruthless enough
.

>However, for clarity, I would like to stress that neither side is blameless
>for many of the events. While to the Habsburgs, the survival of magyars, as
>such, was not a goal, as a matter of fact, many of their acts indicates that
>they would have been happy to have anybody else populating their realm than
>the magyars. This part of their activity is what was detrimental for the
>future of the country.

        So, you think that if we didn't have the Habsburgs our numbers would
be not in the neighborhood of 14 million but 40 million? Or what? Hungary
would be one of the richest country in Europe? Hungary wouldn't have lost
two-thirds of its territory? Hungary would have a larger and more rubust
middle class? What? What?
        And that reminds me, Janos Zsargo said something to the effect that,
"so what? If Hungary remained independent in 1848 or before, she couldn't
have lost more than she lost at Trianon." Well, Janos is wrong. Hungary
could have lost more: like Poland Hungary could have disappeared from the
map of Europe! Trianon wasn't the worst possible outcome. Several other
scanarios can be envisaged.

        In any case, this discussion doesn't lead anywhere. By now, all the
readers know that you think that the Habsburg connection was detrimental to
Hungary while I think otherwise. If people are interested in the subject
they can get a few books and read on the subject and make up their own minds
which interpretation is more sympathetic to them. Why don't we just leave it
that way?

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: World War I (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Eva Balogh writes:

>Jeliko, and taking about last resorts (;)):
>
>>Yes, it was also a "shot heard around the world". At least, to my knowledge,
>>nobody claimed yet that the Hungarians were behind the assassination.
>
>        The Monarchy, at least from the turn of the century (the Pig War)
>had taken a consistently anti-Serb stand because, I think rightly, they were
>certain about Serbia's intentions of creating a Greater Serbia, and that
>Greater Serbia most likely, in their minds, also included Croatian
>territories. Serb nationalism and its striving toward the establishment of
>an enlarged Serbian state, first and foremost, threatened Hungary: the
>Serbian-inhabited areas in the Banat-Bacska area (Vojvodina today),
>Croatia-Slovenia, the Port of Fiume in addition to the commonly held
>territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dalmatia belonging to the Austrian
>half. It is clear that the Hungarians had at least as much to lose by any
>Serbian move backed by Russia, as did the Austrians. Most likely more. It is
>sophistry and blatant disregard of history to claim that Hungary was not
>vitally interested in the Balkans and then, on top of all that, to claim
>that the *only* reason for the outbreak of World War I was that a crazed
>Serbian nationalist, Gavril Princip, happened to assassinate the
>Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne. This assassination was simply the last
>straw which broke the camel's back. The Austro-Hungarian government most
>likely hoped for a quick and easy victory against Serbia. And, by the way,
>public opinion was solidly behind the government. There was a very strong
>anti-Serbian feeling in Hungary. Please, read some contemporary writings on
>that topic. Most educational. (I wrote a whole article about the enthusiasm
>about entering the war and how practically all the Hungarian writers and
>poets were supporting it.) Sure, the Hungarians were not crazy about Franz
>Ferdinand (there was very little to like about him), but, let's face it,
>Austria, if it didn't have Hungary it most likely would have never gotten
>involved in the Balkans. And then there would have been no assassination
>either. Because if the Hungarian revolution had succeeded in 1848 then it is
>most likely that Austria would have joined the other German states to form a
>German nation state.

I am sorry, but I consider the above as a rather simplified treatment of the
geopolitical issue of the times. The situation was much more complicated in
leading up to the Bosnia/Hercegovina "incororation" and the background
activities of Russia, Austria and other nations in the Balkan problems. As
an example, there is a good detailed study in the series "Perspectives in
European History" Volume 11 by
George Hoover Rupp "A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876 - 1878"
published in 1941 by Harvard University Press. While the title implies a
very narrow time span, there is a lot of background information given on a
broader time basis also.
It certainly is not a pro-Magyar treatment considering that heavy reliance
is made on Seton Watson's polemics and the "popularity" of Hungary in 1941
in the west. But when the slanted polemics is disregarded, the treatment of
the Balkan problem is rather good and not one sided. I recommend it to those
who are interested in learning more about the times. Just a few quotes:

"Francis Joseph and his military entourage wished to annex Bosnia and
Herzegovina for military and dynastic reasons, and to obtain new territory
and subjects for the Monarchy. The emperor was a man of mediocre intellect,
of considerable amiability and practical common sense, but his approach to
these problems was always one of his dynastic inheritance....He was neither
a friend nor the foe of the Slav minorities, merely indifferent to them as
long as all went well, as he had been with the Hungarians. He was by nature
and training hostile to innovations, and distrusted those clamoring for
change. Francis Joseph was a pragmatist: in his make-up there was nothing of
the rebel, nothing of the reformer nor of the creative builder. He wished to
annex the Slav South-East as a practical step in the aggrandizement of his
royal house."

and a note from Andrassy to Gorchakov on Sept 9, 1872

"With regard to the East, I emphatically declare that all the rumors that
have been circulated as to our ambitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are
without a shadow of foundation. Accessions of territory, if such were
possible would benefit neither Austrai nor Hungary... The dualistic system
is the main feature of the organization of Austrai-Hungary one half of which
maintains the balance against the other...Austrai-Hungary therefore
inevitable becomes a 'defensive' state unable to indulge in any territorial
aspirations....Hungary especially is so overloaded with rights and
privilages that...the Hungarian vessel would sink under the slightest
addition to her cargo...whether gold or mud. Hungary can undertake no
additional burden."

"General Beck, Chief of the Austrain Staff, in close touch with the Emperor,
stated in his Memoirs, "the road to Salonika must remain open for Austria'
and that of course precluded any strong Slav state in Serbia , or any
Russianized West Balkan state. Francis Joseph's visit in 1869 to
Athens,Constantinople, jerusalem and Suez was considered by many open
announcement of Austria's "Drang nach Osten". Some even talked of an
Austrain interest to India! The one direction in which the door for
expansion stood open was that leading to the East."

" A return to the eastern policy of Prince Eugene and of Joseph II then
began to be talked about of in governing circles. Francis Joseph at first
played with the idea but soon adopted it as a definite goal and it became
the dominant active feature of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy from 1875 on
down to 1914."

"These Slav leaders however had seen at once in the Dualistic Constitution
of 1867 the death knell of their hopes, and many of the military leaders of
the old school in Vienna espoused a policy of Slav aggrandizements in the
Balkans for the declared purpose of counteracting and out-balancing with
these Slavs the ascendancy of Hungary."

It looks like that from Cambridge the view is different than from New Haven.

Regards,Jeliko.
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 11:08 AM 1/29/97 -0500, Jeliko wrote:

>I would like to second or third this type of proposition. Hmm, who is the
>Hungarian delegate to the European parlament, which could be a platform for
>this issue?

        Hmm, hmm. Life is interesting, isn't it. Otto von Habsburg's second
son, Gyorgy, is the Hungarian delegate to the European parliament in case
someone forgot. Nice-looking fellow too.

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: Riding the tiger (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

>At 11:08 AM 1/29/97 -0500, Jeliko wrote:
>
>>I am fully capable of expressing my beliefs and if necessary cling to them.
>>I have never said that the noble's interests were identical to the country's
>>interests, because I disagree with that tenet. What I am arguing is that the
>>Habsburg interests were not identical with the country's interests.
>
>        "Country." This is a very vague term here. Country? The Magyars of
>the country? The nobles of the country? The peasants of the country? My
>feeling that under "country" you mean the Hungarian nation in the modern sense
.
>
>>>I am on the other side.
>>
>>           That is what I am afraid of and therefore, keep up the argument
>>on the issue.
>
>        Why are you afraid of it?
Because you are four square on the Habsburg side, regardless of what they did.


 most unlikely that we will convince each
>other of anything, considering that both of us know the facts pretty well.

>>No it was not a good thing. But a part of the responsibility for that is the
>>willingness of the Habsburgs to compromise with the nobility time after
>>time. And a reason for that compromise was their perception that the support
>>of the nobility was needed to keep them in power.
>
>        Here now you are really getting into some very serious logical
>problem. You are talking on both sides of your mouth. On the one hand, you
>blame the Habsburgs for trying to curb the rights of the nobility which, for
>all practical purposes, meant the right of the country in those days, while,
>on the other hand, you blame them for not being ruthless enough and crush
>them like flies. By the way, my feeling is that if they really wanted to
>crush them like flies they could have. Obviously, they were not ruthless
enough.

Beg to continue to disagree. The Habsburgs not only crushed the nobility.
Often they were an equal opportunity oppressor. In fact, by their actions
they maintained the worst aspects of the oligarchial nobility at the expense
of the rest of the nation.
How many time through the history of Hungary did they install foreign
landowners, who stangely became their enemies also when it was convenient.
Many of the major nobles
were, at a specific time, simple pawns of the Habsburgs. (See examples of
the problem in the quotes from Kann in Habsburgs II)

>
>>However, for clarity, I would like to stress that neither side is blameless
>>for many of the events. While to the Habsburgs, the survival of magyars, as
>>such, was not a goal, as a matter of fact, many of their acts indicates that
>>they would have been happy to have anybody else populating their realm than
>>the magyars. This part of their activity is what was detrimental for the
>>future of the country.
>
>        So, you think that if we didn't have the Habsburgs our numbers would
>be not in the neighborhood of 14 million but 40 million? Or what? Hungary
>would be one of the richest country in Europe? Hungary wouldn't have lost
>two-thirds of its territory? Hungary would have a larger and more rubust
>middle class? What? What?

To not to be poor, you do not have to be the richest. Yes, Hungary would
definitely have had a larger and more robust middle class. Yes, Hungary
would not have been a pawn of Habsburg megalomania. Can you consider not 40
million but 20?  Can you consider life without the constant Habsburg chess
game with Hungary (not only the nobles, but the burghers, the pastors, and
the rest of the folks )?


>        And that reminds me, Janos Zsargo said something to the effect that,
>"so what? If Hungary remained independent in 1848 or before, she couldn't
>have lost more than she lost at Trianon." Well, Janos is wrong. Hungary
>could have lost more: like Poland Hungary could have disappeared from the
>map of Europe!

Last I checked Poland was still on the map.

Trianon wasn't the worst possible outcome. Several other
>scanarios can be envisaged.

What I am claiming is that the "worst outcome" is not good enough.
>
>        In any case, this discussion doesn't lead anywhere. By now, all the
>readers know that you think that the Habsburg connection was detrimental to
>Hungary while I think otherwise. If people are interested in the subject
>they can get a few books and read on the subject and make up their own minds
>which interpretation is more sympathetic to them. Why don't we just leave it
>that way?

I will only bring up the subject if I read something where the goodness of
the Habsburgs for Hungary is espoused again.

Regards,Jeliko.
+ - Action on the Csangos (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear Colleagues,

Two developments in connection with our "Csango-Action":

1) I got a letter from the Unitarian Church indicating, that they have
received our donations, which to date totaled $400. They have already mailed
it to Romania.

At the New York Roundtable, I also asked for donations and will mail them as
soon as all have arrived. Please continue sending your donations to:

Dr. Judit Gellerd
"Center for Free Religion"
1012 Bryant Ave,
Chico, California 95926

Dr. Gellerd does not have an e-mail address, but can be reached through:


2) I received a reply from the Iasi Episcopalia in Romania, concerning our
protest in Rome, concerning their denial of the right of the csangos to hear
the mass in their native language.

This (the fact that at least they have replied to my letter), is a good sign.
It is  possible, that it is a reflection on the changing times in Romania.
Unfortunately, I can not tell what the letter says, because it is in German.
(If one of you is willing to translate it, I will fax it over, and ask you to
post the translation on the HL-list.)

>From the letter, all I can tell is, that they understood enough English to
note that I have misspelled the names of both the Bishop and the Archbishop,
not to mention the name of most towns I talked about. This might be because I
got the information from the csangos, who care even less about spelling as I
do.

If you want to speak up for the rights of the csangos, you can write to the
signer of this letter: spokesperson of the Bishop of Iasi, Episcop Petru
Gherghel (the archbishop does not personally answer his mail - familiar?), by
writing to:

Prof. Vadimir Peterca
Episcopia Romano-Catolika
Boulevard Stefan cel Mare, 26
6600 Iasi, Romania

Best regards: Bela Liptak
+ - HL-Action: letters to JP Morgan (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

****************** CALL FOR ACTION ****************

Priority:
   urgent

Background:
   According to a statement of  the Vice President of  J.P. Morgan
from last year the bank received assurances from the Water Development
Enterprise of Slovakia that none of the loans it lead manag for this
company was spent on the Gabcikovo dam.
   In November, 1996, Miroslav B. Liska, an employee of the Water
Development Enterprise of Slovakia, indicated that the company has
received a loan for end building of Gabcikovo by a group of banks
headed by J.P. Morgan.

What to do:
    Please send a letter to the Vice President of J.P Morgan and
protest. Feel free to use the attached letter written by S.J.
Magyarody. The letter compares the failures of the Army Corps of
Engineers with the Gabcikovo project.
  REMEMBER WE HAVE ONLY 6 WEEKS LEFT TO ACT. PLEASE HELP!! EVERY
LETTER COUNTS!!

Fax 212-648-5210

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


Margaret W. Southerland              January 29, 1997
Vice President
J.P. Morgan
60 Wall Street
New York, N.Y. 10260-0060

RE: Loan to Slovakia

Dear Mrs. Southerland,

   According to a statement of your bank from July 1996 J.P. Morgan
received assurances from the Water Development Enterprise of Slovakia
that none of the loans you manage for this company will be spent
on the Gabcikovo dam.

   On the 26th of November, 1996, Miroslav B. Liska, an employee of the
Water Development Enterprise of Slovakia, indicated that the company
has received a loan to end the building of Gabcikovo by a group of banks
headed by J.P. Morgan.

   Mrs. Southerland, did J.P. Morgan manage the loan for the
completion of the Gabcikovo project? In this case, your bank did not
only neglect the warnings of numerous environmental activists who
recognized this project as environmentally disastrous and illegal,
but J.P. Morgan also acted contrary to its statement from July
1996. Please clear this up.

   I would like to remind you that the Gabcikovo project  did the Danube
("Szigetkoz" region) exactly, what the  Corps of Engineers  did to the
Florida  wetlands.  After spending hundreds of millions of  dollars on
draining  the wetlands, straightening out of rivers with costly dams,
they have realised, that the watertable, so important to the  State,
was lowered and polluted.  Now they are spending hundreds of millions
of  dollars, to put back the  system to its original,  natural  state.

   If your experts did not explain this to you,  they did a very costly
disservice to you and your company.

   Surly, you will not  back an ecological and  financial disaster, like
the Slovakian  project. Or would you?

Sincerely

your name, title, address
+ - HABSBURGS II (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

The following are quotes from Robert A Kann "A History of the Habsburg
Empire 1526-1918" University of California Press, 1974

"The war and the resulting peace of Vasvar, traced in the previous section,
displeased the Hungarian nobility. The great nobles felt that their national
leader, Count Nikolas Zrinyi (Zrinski) had not received the necessary
support of the imperial commander Montecuccoli. Feeling was widespread that
the emperor had fought the war to eliminate Hungarian constitutional
government and to replace it be imperial absolutism after the fashion of the
regime in Bohemia following the battle of White Mountain. Hungary, as far as
it had a voice was alienated by the action of both sides, habsburg and
Ottoman poer alike. Several additional factors, military requisitions,
camping German troops on Hungarian soil, counterreformatory activities, and
the dependency on imperial foreign and defense policy added to the general
dissatisfaction."

" One of the consequences of the great cabal
(Zrinyi/Frangepani/Nadasdy/Tattenbach/etc)
was a wave of persecution of Protestants in Hungary, particularly in the
northern mining towns. Pastors were convicted by special tribunals, in which
Bishop Kollonitsch
played an ignoble part. The pastors were not executed, but achoice of those
convicted was between recantation and serving as galley slaves. Brutal
measures of this kind may have been based on the counterreformatory
tendencies at the imperial court under Jesuit
influence. Yet they could not cover up the fact that Catholic as well as
Protestant nobles participated equally in the conspiracy."

"The special interests of the revolutionary Hungarian noble conspirators may
have obscured the fact, that they fought for a national Hungarian idea. The
religious persecutions directed against the nobles, free and unfree
commoners alike, made this clear to everybody. So did the attempt to
amalgamate the Hungarian administration with that of Vienna. The
establishment of royal gubernatorial office in Pozsony in 1673 was an
important step in this direction. Hungary was treated as a conquered
territory, and treated so without a semblence of justification that had
existed in Bohemia after 1620 - namely the defeat after a general revolt.
Yet a general revolutionary peasant force, the Kurucok, emerged from these
actions and remained at least as a guerillas in being for another generation."

"The Hungarian nation had to pay the bill after the reconquest. By this
conquest land was redistributed now through imperial commission. Former
owners, suspected of disloyalty or religious nonconformances, lost their
estates, which were given to foreigners, mostly German nobles. Worse was
instore for many burghers in northern cities, who lost their property and,
after submission to torture, their lives."

" The Rakoczi revolt had wide support not only of the privilage concious
nobility, but also of the burghers and of many peasants. Rakoczi took up the
cause of religious freedom and that of the oppressed unfree peasantry, for
Magyars and non-Magyars."

"Yet even if Kollonitsch had not been a leader in religious intolerance in
the 1670's,
the reconquest of Hungary in the 1680's culminating in the capture of Buda
in 1686 would have altered the picture. Count Caprara's ruthless military
administration combined features of harsh military occupation, persecution
of Protestants, and strongly partisan actions in favor of German officiers
and nobles now to be endowed with the estates of the heretics."

"Decline in the native Magyar poulation in southern Hungary by more or less
forced emigration during the almost two century long period of Turkish wars
had been made up to a good part by immigration of Southern Slavs into
southern Hungary; the same was true for Roumanian immigrations into
Transylavania. The new settlements were welcome to the Habsburg
administration, which considered the Magyar nobility as the primary source
of political dissaisfaction in the Hungarian realms. Correspondingly Magyar
Immigration from western Hungary into the newly liberated lands was not
encouraged. Instead the government in Vienna, in particular after the
establishment of the colonization committee in Vienna in 1766, urged
immigration of peasants from sothwestern Germany to whom land, livestock,
and tax exemptions were offerred. Besides many estates, vacated during the
Turkish wars by their former owners, were awarded to foreign, mostly German
officiers and nobles. The agricultural structure, therefore, in which the
lower nobility had previously played a dominant part, changed now in favor
of the big aristocratic landowners. More important for future political
developments in Hungary proper, Croatia, and Transylvania, the numbers and
weight of the non-Magyar population rose.

The change in the social structure is one reason why tax reforms like those
in the hereditary and Bohemian lands could not be carried out in Hungary.
The tax exemption of the nobility, in which the big estates owners played a
more prominent part now, remained untouched. This tax structure in turn
hampered Hungarian industrial development. The Hungarian budget was
separated from that of the other Habsburg lands, hence the government in
Vienna had a good excuse to consider Hungary chiefly as a cheap source of
raw materials and agricultural labor. The Hungarian textile, silk, metal,
and ore mining industries, did not receive support comparable to that of in
Austria and the Bohemian lands"

Regards,Jeliko
non-historian
+ - FW: Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Hmm, hmm. Life is interesting.Otto von Habsburg himself is delegate of the
Cristian Social Union ( Conservatives ) of Bavaria ( of Germany ) to the
European Parliament in case somebody shouldn4t be familiar with European
affairs.
At 11:08 AM 1/29/97 -0500, Jeliko wrote:

>I would like to second or third this type of proposition. Hmm, who is the
>Hungarian delegate to the European parlament, which could be a platform for
>this issue?

Little later : Eva Balog wrote :
>       Hmm, hmm. Life is interesting, isn't it. Otto von Habsburg's second
>son, Gyorgy, is the Hungarian delegate to the European parliament in case
>someone forgot. Nice-looking fellow too.

>        Eva Balogh

        Hmm, hmm. Life is interesting, isn4t it. Otto von Habsburg himself
is delegate of the Christian Social Union ( Dole was a liberal compared with
them ) of Bavaria ( of Germany, latter often questioned by Bavarians ) to the
European Parliament in case someone shouldn4t be familiar with European affairs
.
Probably even older than us...

         Miklos Hoffmann
+ - Re: Transylvania in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Jeliko wrote:

> George Antony writes:
> >  Some sort of Austro-Italian
> >involvement, under the aegis of the EU, in the issue of the conditions of
> >Hungarian ethnic minorities would set better parameters and provide a greate
r
> >incentive

> I would like to second or third this type of proposition. Hmm, who is the
> Hungarian delegate to the European parlament, which could be a platform for
> this issue?

The unofficial Hungarian lobbyist to the European Parliament is Otto von
Habsburg, the freshly-appointed Hungarian ambassador to the EU (I think this
is the correct title) is his son, Georg von Habsburg.

But golly, just think about it, Hungary turning to the Habsburgs again ;-)

> I think we can gain more from the vanity of Italy and and Austria to help.

I reckon.  Second-line European countries must find it pretty demeaning to
be continually in the shadow of Germany, France and Britain.  They would
grab any opportunity to be in the limelight.

George Antony
+ - Re: World War I (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 02:05 PM 1/29/97 -0500, Jeliko wrote:

>I am sorry, but I consider the above as a rather simplified treatment of the
>geopolitical issue of the times. The situation was much more complicated in
>leading up to the Bosnia/Hercegovina "incororation" and the background
>activities of Russia, Austria and other nations in the Balkan problems. As
>an example, there is a good detailed study in the series "Perspectives in
>European History" Volume 11 by
>George Hoover Rupp "A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876 - 1878"
>published in 1941 by Harvard University Press.

        Somehow Mr. Rupp didn't make it big in the literature of European
diplomatic history in the second half of the nineteenth century and although
I am quite familiar with the literature on the subject I must admit I am
unfamiliar with him or his work.

>It certainly is not a pro-Magyar treatment considering that heavy reliance
>is made on Seton Watson's polemics and the "popularity" of Hungary in 1941
>in the west. But when the slanted polemics is disregarded, the treatment of
>the Balkan problem is rather good and not one sided. I recommend it to those
>who are interested in learning more about the times. Just a few quotes:

        Anyone who was using Seton-Watson as a serious source on anything
doesn't stand up to my scrutiny.

>It looks like that from Cambridge the view is different than from New Haven.

        I wouldn't generalize. I speak only for myself.

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: HABSBURGS II (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 03:20 PM 1/29/97 -0500, Jeliko wrote:
>The following are quotes from Robert A Kann "A History of the Habsburg
>Empire 1526-1918" University of California Press, 1974

        Dear, dear Mr. Kahn. He was the nicest old gentleman you ever wanted
to meet. And so typically Viennese with his bow tie and impeccable manners.
He wasn't even a bad historian, although he could come up with some strange
ideas at times. I will never forget a public lecture of his on certain
Austrian poets who were just crazy about the First World War. Cheered the
monarchy on! According to him it was all for psychological reasons. They
couldn't serve in the army because they had TB!! Peter Gay demolished poor
old Mr. Kahn mercilessly. I really felt sorry for him and I was angry at
Peter Gay because he was so cruel to such a nice man.

        In any case, Mr. Kahn didn't know any Hungarian and Hungary was not
his forte. He knew more about Bohemia-Moravia and, of course, Austria. The
problem with the history of the Habsburg Empire is that one has to know so
many languages and histories of so many people that it is almost impossible
for one person to master it all. Macartney was complaining about this in the
foreword of his history of the Habsburg empire!

        When it comes to the foreign policy of Andrassy I would rather check
some reliable Hungarian historian who, in addition to German and Austrian
history, is also familiar with the Hungarian language and the Hungarian
political and public opinion at the time.

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: The Trouble With Corporatism (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In article >, Joe Szalai
> writes:

>Sorry to disillusion you, Sam, but I don't have all the answers.  You do.
>Or so it seems.

I'm too busy trying to frame the questions correctly. Thanks, however, for
once again pulling through in the clinch with your customary
predictability.

>
>The ideology that dominates our age is not democracy, socialism,
capitalism,
>or communism, but "corporatism".  By corporatism I mean the development
of
>large groups - not just big business and corporations but bureaucracies
and
>interest groups of all kinds - that try to impose their agenda on society
>and subvert the loyalties of their members from the common good.
>Corporatism reduces civilization to the sum of its corporations, to the
sum
>of its interests.  And in the process it becomes a profound denial of
>everything that is actually positive in our history.

Ever read Alexis De Tocqueville? Indicting anything above the individual
level as inherently anti-democratic seems a touch indiscriminate, not to
mention perverse.

>Corporatism everywhere is fundamentally anti-democratic.  Its drive to
>dominance produces weak governments, frayed social safety nets, an
ignorant
>workforce, a degraded environment, and a culture in which the individual
is
>defined as a consumer or an employee.  Even in government offices
citizens
>are now described as "customers" or "clients".  All of these are stages
in
>the destruction of civilization.

The term you seem to be groping for, I think, is "commodity fetishism."
Here we arrive at a fundamental difference in our world views. Hegel's
belief in historical progression toward some rationalistic human utopia
and Vico and Spengler's belief in the eventual decay of civilizations into
dystopia are two sides of the same determinist Cartesian coin. You
encapsulate the quandary perfectly in this post -- if we cannot have
utopia, we will have its opposite. I rather like Sir Karl Popper's view
that perhaps human history is largely full of sound and fury signifying
nothing and the totalitarian struggle to invest it with any meaning- or
truth-bearing structure is doomed to frustration. It means I can spend
more time listening to my jazz collection.

>
>And why have we been reduced to being merely customers or clients?  The
>reason is because we've accepted that the basic language of public
discourse
>is a language which denies the possibility of the public good.  A
language
>which de-legitimizes the democratic state and the role of citizens.  And
if
>you accept that language, and it seems that most people do, then you are
in
>effect committing suicide.

I think you hit on something worth noting here -- the degree to which
one's command of the particular language-game in play (I use this in a
Wittgensteinian sense and am not implying any frivolity) empowers one as
an actor. We must make very careful choices in the words we use in public
discourse. Language is powerful mojo.

>
>If you, as a citizen, allow your government to talk to you about customer
>services, then it's all over.  There's nothing left to discuss.  You
>shouldn't even bother to vote.  Because if you can't get the language
right,
>if you allow them to describe you and the public interest in a language
>which denies the public interest, the debate is over.

Better a customer than a servant. At least when they refer to me as a
customer, it reminds the bastards that they have an obligation to treat me
with some degree of consideration. Still, I agree with your overall point
-- better they should refer to us as citizens. But that definition has
gotten worn out in spots. All of the implications of inalienable
individual rights still shine, but the equally important parts about
reciprocal obligations have vanished for the most part.

>
>Getting the language right is as critical as finding the time to
participate
>as a citizen.  Democracy is language and participation.

Thank you, Herr Habermas. Would you sign my copy of "Theory of
Communicative Action"?

>
>Language and participation are tied to the idea of rejecting false
>individualism.  The idea that reigns today - that individualism is
walking
>away from society as opposed to participating in society.  That
>individualism is the freedom not to be there - to go on holiday, to go
>skiing - when in fact individualism is about participation and
obligation.
>The more you participate, the more you're an individual.

Make up your mind, Joe. Either corporatism or individualism is the enemy.
You're trying to take on both in the same post. It seems like you're
trying to re-state in much more dramatic terms something I've said over
and over again here -- too much of anything is bad for you.

>
>That's how a real democracy, a humanist democracy is built.  Perhaps
you're
>more interested in the Super Bowl.

I do know now why the chicken crossed the road, if that's what you're
getting at.

>
>I'm sorry if the above ideas seem a bit disjointed.

Maybe this should be your permanent sig.

>
>Joe Szalai
>
>Democracy, n.:
>        A government of the masses.  Authority derived through mass
>meeting or any other form of direct expression.  Results in mobocracy.
>Attitude toward property is communistic... negating property rights.
>Attitude toward law is that the will of the majority shall regulate,
>whether it is based upon deliberation or governed by passion,
>prejudice, and impulse, without restraint or regard to consequences.
>Result is demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, anarchy.
>                -- U. S. Army Training Manual No. 2000-25 (1928-1932),
>                   since withdrawn.

This is great propaganda! Did you make this up on your own or is it actual
disinformation from the period itself?
Sam Stowe



"Those who serve the revolution
plow the sea..."
-- Simon Bolivar
+ - Re: Egy kis lecke Szalai Jozsefnek (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

 on Jan 28 07:49:01 EST 1997 in HUNGARY #898:

>You don't have the foggiest idea what you're talking about, Ferenc.  But
>then again, you're a right-wing ideologue/idiotlogue and I really don't
>expect any illumination, on anything, from you.

Here is another example of the desperate personal attacks some otherwise
quite intelligent people resort to when they run out of rational arguments.
 That's OK, Joe; you just go on believing that your left-wing homosexual type
represents the mainstream.  Then being called a right-winger by you is a
compliment, however unintended.

Ferenc

Ferenc
+ - strings, knots... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Lectoris Salutem!
        Miksch's Law was mentioned here on Friday, sorry for the delay...
        "If a string (a rope too) has one end, it has another end"

        Funny entertainment is to pull a rope at its two ends and to
show which end is pulled by the stronger player (group of players). No
problem with such a simple game, its a question of brute force
(personally I do not prefer this type of game too much)...
        It is more complicated when you find a pile of looped,
disordered string (filament, thread, yarn, ...) and you try to straighten
it out (perhaps it could be used later for some practical purpose).
Usually it is not too difficult to find the end or the two ends of such an
entangled pile of string and it is very easy to pull the two ends in
opposite directions. The problem is, that even without too much brute
force (without tearing into two pieces) such a pile will easily be
transformed into a complicated knot. And the real intellectual challange
(in case of strings, I mean) is to untie knots. I mean really 'untie'
without the famous sword of Alexander the Great.
        I would never begin such a task by pulling the two ends
simultaneously by force. One has to take care of both ends one after the
other, ... repeatedly, carefully, with ease, with precaution. A method to
be wished for some discussing list-partners, too: the partner on the other
end might even help in understanding things sometimes...
        ...and such understanding might be more important than to convince
some people that I am right and the other is wrong...

        But turning again to strings: if one attaches herself/himself too
tightly to only one of the two ends of a string, the result may be (as the
old tune goes..)
        "... a puppet on a {(knotted)} stri-i-i-ing,
                like a puppet on a string!"

        Mindazonaltal (;-)), Istenvelunk...     kadargyorgy

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