Hollosi Information eXchange /HIX/
HIX HUNGARY 999
Copyright (C) HIX
1997-05-16
Új cikk beküldése (a cikk tartalma az író felelőssége)
Megrendelés Lemondás
1 Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind)  5 sor     (cikkei)
2 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  66 sor     (cikkei)
3 Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind)  19 sor     (cikkei)
4 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  55 sor     (cikkei)
5 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  22 sor     (cikkei)
6 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  13 sor     (cikkei)
7 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  61 sor     (cikkei)
8 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  14 sor     (cikkei)
9 Review: Eotvos, _The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth C (mind)  352 sor     (cikkei)
10 HL-Action: request US-office in Gyor (mind)  126 sor     (cikkei)
11 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  10 sor     (cikkei)
12 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  21 sor     (cikkei)
13 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  68 sor     (cikkei)
14 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  16 sor     (cikkei)
15 Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind)  11 sor     (cikkei)
16 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  17 sor     (cikkei)
17 Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind)  44 sor     (cikkei)
18 Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind)  59 sor     (cikkei)
19 George! A first.... (mind)  18 sor     (cikkei)
20 Letter to the Minister of Interior (mind)  59 sor     (cikkei)
21 Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind)  24 sor     (cikkei)
22 Re: George! A first.... (mind)  14 sor     (cikkei)

+ - Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

>>> The New York Times is available on the internet. That's how I read the
>> Vaclav article.   Andy
>So, you are a paying subscriber?
>MKH
No, there is no charge. I had to register to get access. No problem.  Andy.
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Joe Szalai quotes and responds:

>> The dominant party in Hungary's present, freely elected government has
>> been carrying out a solidly Thatcherist program while proudly calling
>> itself the Hungarian Socialist Party.  The opposition, on the other
>> hand, is running on a program demanding massive nationalizations and
>> the restoration of the old socialist welfare state -- whatever that
>> means -- while proudly proclaiming itself the Right.  In truth, party
>> labels are pretty meaningless, and the left/right distinction is worse
>> than useless when it comes to describing the Hungarian political scene.
>
> Then what would be a useful way.  How would you describe the Hungarian
> political scene?

I would describe it as a system in flux, with five parties originally
elected to Parliament in 1994, since grown to six because of a party
split, and soon perhaps to grow to seven with another party in the process
of tearing itself apart.  It's only about eight short years since Hungary
had a multi-party system, and the parties are still in the process of
self-definition.  Like everywhere else, the electorate has a huge
floating component which shows up "undecided" in the opinion polls.
Six parties are clearly too many, and a shake-out is inevitable in
the long run.  This makes many Hungarian politicians panic-stricken,
and often causes them to raise the volume of their rhetoric in a way
that is baffling to those who don't live there.

There are strong indications that the "floating" component of the
electorate voted en masse for the Hungarian Democratic Forum in 1990,
then migrated to the Socialists in 1994, giving them a landslide
victory and an absolute majority in Parliament.  Where this floating
component will end up in 1998 in anybody's guess.  There are strong
indications that the "floating" component is the least ideological
part of the electorate, and that they tend to vote for the party that
promises the most stability and the least amount of turmoil.  In 1990
the Hungarian Democratic Forum was billing itself as 'The Quiet Force"
(a literal translation of the French Socialists' electoral slogan,
"La Force Tranquille").  This worked like a charm, but the HDF
could not repeat the trick in 1994, and the Socialists took over.
In many ways the Socialists are the least ideological and most pragmatic
party among the ones on offer, and they may very well pull it off
again.  Especially if the opposition manages to scare off the floating
portion of the electorate with overheated rhetoric, dire warnings, and
threats of purges and upheavals.

Such floating blocks of voters can do strange things, by the way.
It seems that a large portion of the voters of the Front National
in France used to vote for the Communists up until very recently.
Just goes to show how little ideology matters when it comes to
voting behavior.

> When political parties are the same, why bother to vote?  It won't
> matter.  The political process becomes a sham.  Only those in power
> or privilege, or those who are close to it, can take solace from
> this situation.

Politics is not about solace.  Politics is a profession, or a trade,
like plumbing or the law.  The parties are not "the same".  There are
huge differences among them in terms of style, competence, imagination,
the propensity for corruption, and a number of other attributes.  The
same is true about plumbers and lawyers.  When you cast your vote, you
are purchasing a service.  It behooves you to pay attention, and make
a careful choice.  Otherwise you are likely to be shafted by unscrupulous
operators.

-----
Gabor Fencsik
+ - Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

George Antony writes, in re those crass/ignorant/uninformed NY Times
correspondents everyone is talking about:

>> I supplied some
>> counterexamples produced by some of the better known NY Times
>> correspondents whose name happened to pop into mind just then.  There is
>> nothing extraordinary about them: they are just professionals at the top
>> of their game who know how to produce a service people are willing to buy.
>
> Given my real stand, this devotional segment contributed very little to the
> discussion.  Neither do I disagree with any of it, nor does it consitute
> a refutation of my stand.

Devotional?  I did not even say if the articles were good or bad.  That
was for you to decide.  I only asked if you read them.  I guess now we'll
never know...

-----
Gabor Fencsik
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Joe Szalai writes:

>> Such floating blocks of voters can do strange things, by the way.
>> It seems that a large portion of the voters of the Front National
>> in France used to vote for the Communists up until very recently.
>> Just goes to show how little ideology matters when it comes to
>> voting behavior.
>
> You're right, but with ideology not playing such a strong role in
> people's voting behaviour, there's nothing to stop this floating
> block from supporting totalitarian parties.

There is nothing to stop people from supporting totalitarian parties,
period.  Except their common sense, of course.  Which is where we all
place our trust as citizens in a democratic society.

As for the question whether six parties are too many, and whether
a shake-out is inevitable -- I think the answer lies in the Hungarian
electoral system.  It is an amazingly complicated beast that mixes
elements of first-past-the-post and proportional representation,
with some MPs elected in single-member districts, and others picked
from party lists according to a complicated formula based on the
nationwide and regional distribution of votes.  The picture is further
clouded by a first and second round of voting held a few weeks apart.
The system was designed in 1989 essentially by two people (Tolgyessy
and Antall), both of whom had remarkably byzantine tastes.  Like many other
electoral systems, it has some non-linear properties that are difficult
to analyze.  The upshot is that a single party with 20 percent of the
vote will end up with a lot more seats than two parties with 10 percent
each.  This creates a clear incentive for small parties to merge --
assuming they behave like rational actors.

>> Politics is not about solace.  Politics is a profession, or a trade,
>> like plumbing or the law.  The parties are not "the same".  There are
>> huge differences among them in terms of style, competence, imagination,
>> the propensity for corruption, and a number of other attributes.  The
>> same is true about plumbers and lawyers.
>
> Sorry, but politics is not like plumbing or the law.  In the professions
> and trades people are trained and certified.  In politcs, the most
> brilliant and the most ignorant have one vote.  And no, when I cast my
> vote, I'm not purchasing a service.

I don't see why not.  A plumber spends a considerable amount of time
up to his armpits in excrement, and gets paid handsomely for it.  Lawyers
also do a great many unspeakable things, and get fat fees in return.
What do politicians do?  They spend their days dealing with stuff most
of us don't want to be bothered with: tax-loss carryforwards, mosquito
abatement districts, zoning variances, grazing fees, and other dreadfully
boring stuff.  Then for recreation they get to eat rubber chicken at the
paving contractors' convention.  I say anyone who wants a life like that
is suspect, and deserves to be watched very closely.

-----
Gabor Fencsik
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Joe Szalai wrote:
>
> At 06:56 PM 5/15/97 -0400, Eva Balogh wrote:
>
> >At 03:10 PM 5/15/97 +0200, Miklos Hoffmann wrote:
> >
> >>Why does nobody ask whether there is a middle ( somwhere? )
> >
> >        Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, the new head of the SZDSZ caucus in parliament
> >said that the SZDSZ is in the middle. I would have agreed with him before
> >they felt compelled to form a government with the MSZP. But now it is
> >difficult to claim that they are in the middle of the political spectrum. ES
B
>
> What is 'the middle', if not just a reaction to the left and right?  The
> middle has no ideology of its own.  It can not.  Nor is it inherently a
> good or righteous position to take.
>
> Joe Szalai
It may happen to be like this. That would be a lousy middle, indeed. But
I don4t know of any reason, why this should apply.
MKH
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

E.S. Balogh wrote:
>
> At 03:10 PM 5/15/97 +0200, Miklos Hoffmann wrote:
>
> >Why does nobody ask whether there is a middle ( somwhere? )
>
>         Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, the new head of the SZDSZ caucus in parliament
> said that the SZDSZ is in the middle. I would have agreed with him before
> they felt compelled to form a government with the MSZP. But now it is
> difficult to claim that they are in the middle of the political spectrum. ESB
MDNP? FIDESZ ( I know, we don4t quite agree on FIDESZ. We4ll have to
wait and see ).
MKH
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Gabor Fencsik wrote:
>
> Joe Szalai writes:
>
> >> Such floating blocks of voters can do strange things, by the way.
> >> It seems that a large portion of the voters of the Front National
> >> in France used to vote for the Communists up until very recently.
> >> Just goes to show how little ideology matters when it comes to
> >> voting behavior.
> >
> > You're right, but with ideology not playing such a strong role in
> > people's voting behaviour, there's nothing to stop this floating
> > block from supporting totalitarian parties.
>
> There is nothing to stop people from supporting totalitarian parties,
> period.  Except their common sense, of course.  Which is where we all
> place our trust as citizens in a democratic society.
>
> As for the question whether six parties are too many, and whether
> a shake-out is inevitable -- I think the answer lies in the Hungarian
> electoral system.  It is an amazingly complicated beast that mixes
> elements of first-past-the-post and proportional representation,
> with some MPs elected in single-member districts, and others picked
> from party lists according to a complicated formula based on the
> nationwide and regional distribution of votes.  The picture is further
> clouded by a first and second round of voting held a few weeks apart.
> The system was designed in 1989 essentially by two people (Tolgyessy
> and Antall), both of whom had remarkably byzantine tastes.  Like many other
> electoral systems, it has some non-linear properties that are difficult
> to analyze.  The upshot is that a single party with 20 percent of the
> vote will end up with a lot more seats than two parties with 10 percent
> each.  This creates a clear incentive for small parties to merge --
> assuming they behave like rational actors.
>
> >> Politics is not about solace.  Politics is a profession, or a trade,
> >> like plumbing or the law.  The parties are not "the same".  There are
> >> huge differences among them in terms of style, competence, imagination,
> >> the propensity for corruption, and a number of other attributes.  The
> >> same is true about plumbers and lawyers.
> >
> > Sorry, but politics is not like plumbing or the law.  In the professions
> > and trades people are trained and certified.  In politcs, the most
> > brilliant and the most ignorant have one vote.  And no, when I cast my
> > vote, I'm not purchasing a service.
>
> I don't see why not.  A plumber spends a considerable amount of time
> up to his armpits in excrement, and gets paid handsomely for it.  Lawyers
> also do a great many unspeakable things, and get fat fees in return.
> What do politicians do?  They spend their days dealing with stuff most
> of us don't want to be bothered with: tax-loss carryforwards, mosquito
> abatement districts, zoning variances, grazing fees, and other dreadfully
> boring stuff.  Then for recreation they get to eat rubber chicken at the
> paving contractors' convention.  I say anyone who wants a life like that
> is suspect, and deserves to be watched very closely.
>
> -----
> Gabor Fencsik
I am just curious what Gabor Fencsik is doing when he is not
contributing to the Discussion list. ( I enjoyed his contributions
very much. )
Miklos Hoffmann
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Joe Szalai wrote:
>
> At 03:10 PM 5/15/97 +0200, Miklos Hoffmann wrote:
>
> <snip>
> >Why does nobody ask whether there is a middle ( somwhere? )
> >
> >MKH
>
> Middle?  Middle!?  Are you sure you don't you mean "muddle"?
>
> Joe Szalai
Ye see!? ye even forget the word!
;-(( MKH
+ - Review: Eotvos, _The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth C (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Just thought maybe this would interest some of you...Hugh Agnew

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
HABSBURG Reviews 1997/22                                May 14, 1997

                    Diagnosing the Dominant Ideas

Reviewed by Elizabeth A. Drummond, Georgetown University
> for HABSBURG

Jozsef Eotvos. _The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century and
Their Impact on the State. Volume I: Diagnosis_.  Translated and
edited by D. Mervyn Jones.  Boulder, Co.: Social Science Monographs;
Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.; New
York: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1996.  Atlantic
Studies on Society in Change, No. 87; East European Monographs, No.
463.  543 pp.  Editor's preface, notes, and annotated index. $56
(cloth), ISBN 0-88033-360-X.

D. Mervyn Jones has done students of the Habsburg Empire, and of
European history in general, an immeasurable service with his
translation into English of Jozsef Eotvos's classic _The Dominant
Ideas of the Nineteenth Century and Their Impact on the State_.
This is the first English translation of Eotvos's two volume work, a
work previously available in Hungarian and German. (1)  Only the
first volume, _Diagnosis_, will be reviewed here; volume II,
_Remedy_, was unavailable at the time of this review.

  As Eotvos may not be as well known as other Hungarian reformers (for
example, Count Istvan Szechenyi, Lajos Kossuth, and Ferenc Deak), a
short biographical sketch is necessary before turning to a discussion
of _The Dominant Ideas_.  Although his father and grandfather were
both high-ranking officials in the Habsburg Empire, Baron Jozsef
Eotvos (1813-1871) came to identify increasingly with the cause of
Hungarian social and political reform.  Two trends in
nineteenth-century Europe influenced Eotvos above all: romanticism
and liberalism. (2)  The romantic influence can be seen in his
literary production and in his belief about the social significance
of literature. (3)  The influence of European liberalism is most
easily seen in Eotvos's political career and his role in the
Hungarian social and political reform movement.  Before the 1848
revolutions Eotvos played a prominent role in both the Hungarian
literary revival and in the reform movement.  He served as the
Minister of Religion and Education in the Hungarian Ministry from
April to September 1848, resigning after the conflict between the
Hungarian Ministry and Vienna became unavoidable.

  While in self-imposed exile in Munich, Eotvos formulated his
political thoughts in three treatises, the last two of which were
the two volumes of _The Dominant Ideas_. (4)  He returned to
Hungary in December, 1850 and resumed both his political and
literary careers.  Allied with the Deak faction, Eotvos played a
significant role in the years immediately preceding the _Ausgleich_.
In the government established under Prime Minister Gyula Andrassy,
he served once again as Minister of Religion and Education.  His
greatest political achievement was the Elementary Education Act (1
December 1868), which established compulsory education in Hungary
and in which the educational autonomy of the churches and
nationalities was protected.

  Eotvos's political undertakings on problems of education and the
nationalities were informed by the political theory he espoused in
_The Dominant Ideas_.  His analysis centered on two issues which he
felt were responsible for the failure of the reform movement: 1. the
rights of nationalities and 2. the organization of a modern
constitutional state.  He sought to develop a theory of the liberal
state founded on the principle of constitutionalism which ensured
the rights of individuals and nationalities.  Eotvos attributed the
failure of 1848 to the contradictions between two interpretations of
the dominant ideas of the time: liberty, equality, and nationality;
that is, there was a conflict between "the form in which the ideas
have been propounded...and in the way in which attempts have been
made to realize these ideas." (p. 88)  The question which Eotvos
sought to answer in volume I of his work was whether the dominant
ideas could be realized according to their revolutionary
interpretations without precluding the existence of large states. (p. 89)

  Eotvos began his work by defining what he termed the three "dominant
ideas" of the time.  Liberty was defined as "the state in which people
can use both their own abilities and the natural forces in their
environment to achieve objectives of their own choice. (p. 91)
Equality, as applied to the state, was "the equal subjection or equal
independence of everyone, the equal entitlement of all to exercise
State power. (p. 91)  The third principle, nationality, was defined
as "the efforts of individual peoples to reach the situation to which
all may feel themselves entitled by virtue of their past (historic
rights), greatness or other attributes. (p. 91)  Since the French
Revolution, however, these ideas had been interpreted according to
quite different, revolutionary interpretations.

  The principal arguments that Eotvos made were, first, that these ideas,
in their revolutionary interpretations, were mutually incompatible
and second, that these ideas were incompatible with existing states.  He
began elaborating this argument in chapter two by demonstrating how
the revolutionary interpretations of liberty and equality were
incompatible.  In his view, since the French Revolution, liberty had been
interpreted as the principle of popular sovereignty -- the "supremacy of
the people." (p. 92).  Liberty had thus become a corollary of the
principle of equality, inasmuch as the principle of equality demanded
that every individual have an equal share in the governing of the state.
The theory of popular sovereignty, however, negated the principle of
individual liberty because it granted to the state absolute power over
the citizenry.  Eotvos argued that the nature of power was to expand,
particularly when those who exercised the power were the same who could
set limits to it, i.e., the people.  The coupling of liberty and popular
sovereignty resulted in a situation in which the people's liberty was
greater the more the power of the state expanded.  As the power of
the state expanded, however, the more individual liberty was limited;
individual freedom of action decreased as spheres of life were
increasingly assigned to the state. (p. 93)

  Eotvos contrasted the revolutionary interpretations of liberty and
equality with their traditional interpretations.  For Eotvos, the
model was England.  In England, liberty, according to its traditional
interpretation, meant that no absolute power existed.  The
institutions of English government -- the king, the Parliament, the
courts -- were all limited in their power.  The British Constitution
was, therefore, a "free" constitution.  The traditional English
interpretation of liberty supported, and was supported by, the
concept of equality.  All British subjects were equal before the law;
their equality and their liberty were guaranteed by free institutions.
(pp. 94ff)  "In a word, in Britain equality means equal
liberty." (p. 96)

  In chapter three, Eotvos next argued that the revolutionary principle of
nationality was incompatible with the revolutionary principles of liberty and
equality.  He argued that nationality had, since the French Revolution,
been determined by a common language and by appeals to historic rights.
The national ideal was to organize states in accordance with linguistic
communities.  He argued that all national movements aspired to the same
goal:  "The basis of every national aspiration is a feeling of
superiority; its aim, domination." (p. 110)

  Again, Eotvos appealed to the example of England (and also to
the United States and Switzerland), where the traditional,
pre-revolutionary interpretation of nationality was still dominant.  The
traditional interpretation of nationality was devoid of linguistic
meaning; rather, it signified a territorial loyalty.  In this way,
nationality had advanced the causes of liberty and equality: "Whichever
country or period we consider, we find that the idea of nationality
always recedes into the background in proportion as the concepts of
liberty and equality advance towards realization; on the other hand
national autonomy survives intact nowhere more than in countries where
the principle of liberty and equality are not applied." (p. 118)  Eotvos
concluded, therefore, that the revolutionary, linguistic concept of
nationality was incompatible with the concepts of liberty and
equality. (5)

  Eotvos turned, then, to a discussion of how the dominant ideas, in
their revolutionary interpretations, were incompatible with existing
states.  If these revolutionary objectives were achieved, he argued in
chapters four and five, the result could only be the dissolution of
existing states. He proceeded to analyze the various proposals which were
being put forward to reconcile the dominant ideas with the structure of the
state: 1. to build upon the existing order, 2. electoral reform, and
3. transition to a republic.  In chapters eight through ten, however,
he explained how each of these solutions are found lacking.

  Having done that Eotvos concluded that it was not the dominant ideas
themselves which were responsible for the tensions in society, but rather
the ways in which these ideas were "commonly" understood and applied. (pp.
349f)  The revolutionary interpretations of the dominant ideas -- "that
all the efforts to realize liberty and equality are in fact directed only
to realizing as completely as possible in the State the idea of the
supremacy of the people; the efforts launched in the name of the principle
of nationality aim solely at obtaining absolute supreme power in the
State for a particular nationality" -- were therefore incompatible with
European civilization, and that the realization of these ideas,
interpreted as such, would necessarily bring about the disintegration of
existing states. (p. 350)  Despotism would be the only result.

  Eotvos foreshadowed volume II of his work in the conclusion to this
volume.  He argued that the state must be based on the principle of
liberty, rather than equality, nationality, or popular sovereignty:
"...we must seek the preventative against this disaster not in the
absolute power of a State built on democratic foundations but on the
contrary _in the principle of liberty_, on which our social order has
been based, but which has been disregarded in the modern organization
of the State since the principle of liberty was replaced by that of
the people's supremacy." (p. 365)  In volume II Eotvos presented his
proposal for reform of the state structure.  Eotvos argued that
only by limiting the realm of state power and by expanding the sphere
of individual action would liberty be safeguarded. (6)

  Eotvos's ideas bear some resemblance to the arguments of other
contemporary European writers.  That Eotvos and contemporaries such
as Karl Marx, Friedrich List, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart
Mill (and this list is certainly not exhaustive) influenced each
other must be considered.  Eotvos primarily framed his arguments with
an examination of classical history and the French Revolution.  He
tended, therefore, to make only passing references to his
contemporaries, although he obviously read them.  The exception was
Francois Guizot, to whose work Eotvos often referred, particularly in
relation to his understanding of European history.  While Eotvos
discussed communism and argued that communism would be the "logical
development of the principles on which every present-day State
institution is based," he made no specific reference to Marx. (p. 313)  To
List he referred once as evidence that "even the cosmopolitan Germans"
conformed to his conclusion that no nation would be content merely with
equality of rights, but rather would be satisfied with nothing less than
supremacy over those peoples around it. (p. 111)

  Although Eotvos differed from Tocqueville in his strong critique of
nationalism, he was nonetheless strongly influenced by Tocqueville's
pre-1848 writings.  Eotvos was particularly influenced by
Tocqueville's warning about the dangers of the tyranny of the
majority and his emphasis on the role of the township and local self-
government.  Eotvos focused on the dangers of the concept of popular
sovereignty in volume I of _The Dominant Ideas_, and he explicitly
endorsed Tocqueville's conclusions about the threat that absolute
power posed to individual liberty by including a lengthy quotation
from _De la democratie en Amerique_ in his conclusion to volume I.
(pp. 361-363)  Similarly, in volume II Eotvos, clearly influenced by
Tocqueville, proposed a constitutional system in which the autonomous
township would replace the county system.  Tocqueville and Eotvos did
indeed correspond with each other, and Eotvos saw Tocqueville's _The
Old Regime and the French Revolution_ as an endorsement of his own
conclusions in _The Dominant Ideas_. (7)  Similarly, Jones notes that
upon the publication of John Stuart Mill's _On Liberty_ in 1859,
Eotvos was quite pleased to discover how similar his ideas were to
Mill's, and even sent him a copy of _The Dominant Ideas_. (p. 39)

  Although _The Dominant Ideas_ has often been described as a classic
treatise on the concept of nationality, it appears that Eotvos
regarded it even more as a treatise on the concept of liberty.  What
will strike most readers, however, is how accurately Eotvos predicted
the dangers of nationalism.  He concluded that nationalism was indeed
the most threatening danger to European civilization, a conclusion
which has been borne out by events of the twentieth century.  His
catastrophic view of the principle of nationality could, however, be
considered somewhat overdone.  Eotvos argued that all nationalities
strive for domination, regardless of whether the nationality in
question is the dominant nationality in the state.  He argued that
those "oppressed" nationalities which claim to strive for equal
rights and autonomy would seek domination once equal rights had been
achieved. (p. 112)  Historians of the Slovak national movement, for
example, would certainly counter Eotvos and argue that this movement
only sought autonomy, not domination. (8)

  D. Mervyn Jones is responsible for the translating, editing,
annotation, and introductory essay for this first translation of
Eotvos's _The Dominant Ideas_.  Jones prefaces Eotvos's work with his
own introduction.  This is largely a biographical introduction to
Eotvos's careers as both a writer and a reformer.  Jones is, however,
at his weakest when discussing the events of 1848 and how they
influenced Eotvos in writing _The Dominant Ideas_.  His discussion of
the events of 1848 is brief and does not provide an adequate
framework for the development of Eotvos's ideas.  Similarly, he only
refers to the content of _The Dominant Ideas_ in relation to Eotvos's
other works and his practical efforts as a politician.  _The Dominant
Ideas_ is an important work not only for students of the Habsburg
Empire, but also for students of European intellectual history and of
the history of nationalism.  For those readers less acquainted with
Eotvos and the history of Hungary, more discussion of the context of
1848 would be useful.

  The strength of Jones's introduction is his discussion of the
translation itself.  It is clear that Jones consulted the original
German version, the first Hungarian version, and the second Hungarian
version of the work in preparing this translation.  Although Eotvos
was a prominent member of the Hungarian literary revival, his first
language was German; as such, it may not be surprising to learn that
he initially wrote _The Dominant Ideas_ in German.  Jones notes,
however, that the title page of the _original_ German version stated
that the author  had translated the work from Hungarian into German
himself.  That Eotvos chose to present the Hungarian _translation_ as
the original to the general public is in itself an interesting side
note to his views concerning nationality and language.  Eotvos was
involved in the translation of the work into Hungarian (although he
was not solely responsible), which entailed some editing, and in the
revisions for the second Hungarian edition.  Although this
translation into English stems primarily from the first Hungarian
edition, Jones comprehensive knowledge of all three versions allows him to
discuss some of the discrepancies and differences among the versions in
the introduction.

  Some of the discrepancies between the German and the Hungarian
versions resulted merely from the weaknesses of Hungarian political
vocabulary at the time.  German words, such as _Staatsstreiche_ or
_die herrschenden Ideen_, were translated into different Hungarian
approximations at different places in the text (_allamcsinyek_ versus
_allammerenyek_ and _Uralkodo Eszmek_ versus _Vezereszmek_
respectively).  Some errors resulted from the apparent lack of a copy
editor and from the quick pace at which the translation was done.
There were two types of mistranslations from the German to the
Hungarian, of which Jones gives examples in his introduction: 1.
mistranslations extending beyond a single word and 2. mistakes
in or omissions of single words.  In such cases, Jones follows the
original German.  Other discrepancies between the German and the
Hungarian resulted from the editing of the work during the
translation, presumably with Eotvos's approval.  With one exception
(a note to chapter 7), the changes were shortenings of the text.  In
the case of such revisions, Jones follows the Hungarian translation.

  By consulting both the German and Hungarian versions, Jones's
translation has ensured consistency and continuity.  Although my lack
of Hungarian knowledge hinders me in judging the quality of the
translation, a comparison of the original German with this
translation indicates that Jones has produced an excellent
translation.  While acknowledged as a leading reformer in nineteenth
century Hungary, Eotvos has often been overlooked in the West as a
thinker. Certainly, his classic of nineteenth century political
theory has been overshadowed by the works of many of his
contemporaries.  Jones's translation and editing has provided the
English-speaking world access to Eotvos's ideas.  For that Mr. Jones
is to be commended.

Notes

1. Jozsef Eotvos, _A XIX. szazad uralkodo eszmeinek befolyasa az
   alladalomra_, 2 volumes (Vienna/Pest: Prochaska Karoly
   konyvnyomdaja, 1851-1854); _Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen
   des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat_, 2 volumes (Leipzig F.A.
   Brockhaus, 1851-1854).

2. For a good discussion of the Eotvos's influences, see Paul Body,
  _Joseph Eotvos and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840-1870: A Study
  of Ideas of Individuality and Social Pluralism in Modern Politics_,
  in Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 62/2
  (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1972).

3. See Jones's introduction; Body, op. cit.; and Steven B. Vardy,
  _Baron Joseph Eotvos, A Literary Biography_ (Boulder, CO/Highland
  Lakes, NJ/New York: Social Science Monographs; Distributed by
  Columbia University Press, 1987).

4. The other treatise was: Jozsef Eotvos, _Ueber die
   Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitaeten in Oesterreich_
  (Pest/Leipzig: C.A. Hartleben, 1850).

5. For an analysis of Eotvos's discussion of nationality and his
   application of the theory to Hungary, see Johann Weber, _Eotvos und
   die ungarische Nationalitaetenfrage_ (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1966).

6. See volume II of _The Dominant Ideas_; for his application of
   these principles to the Habsburg Monarchy, see _Die Garantien der
   Macht und Einheit Oesterreichs_ (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1859).
   For a discussion of these ideas, see the works by Body and Weber.

7. For a discussion of Tocqueville and Eotvos, see Body, op. cit.,
   especially pp. 69-73.

8. See Irina Popova's review of Laszlo Szarka's _Szlovak nemzeti
   fejlodes -- magyar nemzetisegi politika 1867-1918_ (Pozsony:
   Kalligram Kiado, 1995); reviewed for HABSBURG, 15 May 1996.  The
   review and the subsequent discussion may be found at http://www.h-
   net.msu.edu/~habsweb/archives/threads/szarka.html.

       Copyright (c) 1997 by H-Net, all rights reserved.  This work may be
       copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is given to
       the review and to HABSBURG.  For all other permission, please
       contact > and >.
+ - HL-Action: request US-office in Gyor (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

****************** CALL FOR ACTION ****************

Priority:      normal

Background:
  A new success for the Hungarian Lobby: According to an announcement
of Al Gore and Madeleine Albright the new foreign policy of the US
government will deal with the protection of natural treasures all over
the World. This policy is regarded as an integral part of national
security.
  The result of this new foreign policy is that the USA will open 12
regional offices in the 12 environmentally most endangered areas in
the World. Thus, our next goal is to reach that one of these offices
will establish in Gyor (Northwest of Hungary). This step would show
the American care for the Danube to the whole World.

What to do:
  Please help to persuade the Clinton, Gore and Albright to open one
of the planned offices in Gyor. Feel free to use the attached form
letters.
   IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE POLITICIANS FIND THOUSANDS OF LETTERS IN
THEIR MAILBOX. PLEASE ACT!! Please SEND EVEN SNAIL MAILS. These are
more effective.

e-mail address of President Clinton:


e-mail of Vice President Gore:


e-mail of the Secretary of State Albright:


*************************************************************
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
letter to Clinton:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

<date>

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20001
(e-mail: )

RE: Establishment of environmental office in Gyor (Hungary)

Dear Mr. President:

Please consider the city of Gyor in Hungary, as one of the 12 new
regional environmental hubs to be established by the State Department.
This would show your interest in the survival of the natural treasures
of the Szigetkoz wetlands, which evolved from Europe's only inland
sea-delta and survived since the last Ice Age.

The Szigetkoz Wetlands are endangered since Slovakia illegally
diverted the Danube river, depriving Hungary of her natural resource.
The result is devastating environmental damage.

Respectfully yours,

<Your name, address, title>



xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
letter to Gore:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

<date>

The Honorable Al Gore
Vice President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20001
(e-mail: )

RE: Establishment of environmental office in Gyor (Hungary)

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Please consider the city of Gyor in Hungary, as one of the 12 new
regional environmental hubs to be established by the State Department.
This would show your interest in the survival of the natural treasures
of the Szigetkoz wetlands, which evolved from Europe's only inland
sea-delta and survived since the last Ice Age.

The Szigetkoz Wetlands are endangered since Slovakia illegally
diverted the Danube river, depriving Hungary of her natural resource.
The result is devastating environmental damage.

Respectfully yours,

<Your name, address, title>


xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
letter to Albright:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

<date>

The Honorable Madeleine Albright
United States Secretary of State
United States Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
( E-Mail:  )

RE: Establishment of environmental office in Gyor (Hungary)

Dear Madame Secretary:

Please consider the city of Gyor in Hungary, as one of the 12 new
regional environmental hubs to be established by the State Department.
This would show your interest in the survival of the natural treasures
of the Szigetkoz wetlands, which evolved from Europe's only inland
sea-delta and survived since the last Ice Age.

The Szigetkoz Wetlands are endangered since Slovakia illegally
diverted the Danube river, depriving Hungary of her natural resource.
The result is devastating environmental damage.

Respectfully yours,

<Your name, address, title>
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 03:10 PM 5/15/97 +0200, Miklos Hoffmann wrote:

<snip>
>Why does nobody ask whether there is a middle ( somwhere? )
>
>MKH

Middle?  Middle!?  Are you sure you don't you mean "muddle"?

Joe Szalai
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 06:47 PM 5/14/97 -0400, Eva Balogh wrote:

>Joe,
>        I almost forgot: the Munkaspart has a homepage. Why don't >you
visit them.

Thanks for the info, but I'll pass.  The Munkaspart has no credibility
because it is tainted by it's history.

>One of their vice-presidents and I have had a long and not very
>fruitful discussion about his party. You can see his picture on the
>home-page.

Oh, whoopee!  I just hope you don't fantasize me as being turned on by
political icons or personality cults.

>Nice guy and very earnest. ESB

I'm sure he is.  And he probably means well, too.

Joe Szalai
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 02:26 PM 5/14/97 -0700, Gabor Fencsik wrote:

<snip>
>The dominant party in Hungary's present, freely elected government has
>been carrying out a solidly Thatcherist program while proudly calling
>itself the Hungarian Socialist Party.  The opposition, on the other
>hand, is running on a program demanding massive nationalizations and
>the restoration of the old socialist welfare state -- whatever that
>means -- while proudly proclaiming itself the Right.  In truth, party
>labels are pretty meaningless, and the left/right distinction is worse
>than useless when it comes to describing the Hungarian political scene.

Then what would be a useful way.  How would you describe the Hungarian
political scene?

>I don't see why this is necessarily bad news.  The less ideology-driven
>the politics of Hungary becomes, the more the country will approach the
>political setup of mature democracies.

I live in a 'mature democracy', I still vote, and yet I feel rather
powerless.  And I don't think I'm alone.  Political participation is on the
decline in many Western democracies partly because politics are not as
ideology-driven as they used to be and mainly because political parties
that 'play by the rules', i.e., those who want power at all costs, are
singing the same castrati tunes.  The big losers are the majority of people
who vote and are continually disappointed by the political process.  The
big winners, for the time being, are the big multinationals who have more
power than political parties.  Often, they have more power than nation states.

>Notice that the victory of Labor
>in Britain was largely due to the fact that Labor over the years has
>stolen the clothes of its opponents, and ended up winning on a platform
>that was very hard to distinguish from the program of the Conservatives.
>Their very first move (transferring responsibility for day-to-day
>monetary policy to an independent Bank of England) is an act of fiscal
>rectitude that warms the heart of all dyed-in-the-wool conservatives
>everywhere.

When political parties are the same, why bother to vote?  It won't matter.
The political process becomes a sham.  Only those in power or privilege, or
those who are close to it, can take solace from this situation.

>The less ideology-driven the parties, the more clear it is to everyone
>what politics is all about: naked greed and the will to power.

Gee-whiz.  And I always thought my politics was about taking power away
from the powerful.

<snip>
>By the way, if you are looking for an old-fashioned leftist political
>party of the fraternal-solidarity-with-the-heroic-Cuban-people
>proletarian-internationalist persuasion, then I can recommend you look
>into the Workers' Party.

Didn't you just say that the "left/right distinction is worse
than useless when it comes to describing the Hungarian political scene"?

>Its chances of winning any election, for
>M.P. or dog-catcher, are meager at best.  But it does exist.  I even
>met some people who freely admit having voted for them.  What is
>sorely missing from the Hungarian political scene is the equivalent
>of that uniquely English political entity, the Monster Raving Loony
>Party.  But in every other way, we are catching up fast.

So, it seems that you're content that the political process has become a
complete joke.  I just wonder how long we'll be laughing.

Joe Szalai
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 06:56 PM 5/15/97 -0400, Eva Balogh wrote:

>At 03:10 PM 5/15/97 +0200, Miklos Hoffmann wrote:
>
>>Why does nobody ask whether there is a middle ( somwhere? )
>
>        Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, the new head of the SZDSZ caucus in parliament
>said that the SZDSZ is in the middle. I would have agreed with him before
>they felt compelled to form a government with the MSZP. But now it is
>difficult to claim that they are in the middle of the political spectrum. ESB

What is 'the middle', if not just a reaction to the left and right?  The
middle has no ideology of its own.  It can not.  Nor is it inherently a
good or righteous position to take.

Joe Szalai
+ - Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

On Fri, 16 May 1997, A.J.Vadasz wrote:

> >>> The New York Times is available on the internet. That's how I read the
> >> Vaclav article.   Andy
> >So, you are a paying subscriber?
> >MKH
> No, there is no charge. I had to register to get access. No problem.  Andy.
>
Only if you have a USA address, from me they wanted a credit card number.

Barna Bozoki
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 01:32 PM 5/15/97 +0100, Eva Durant wrote:
>Excuse me, but what exactly is the function of
>a political party? I thought as their name suggests,
>they suppose to have a political idea about how to
>govern for the interest of at least those whose
>vote they claim.  If they have no such idea, they
>shouldn't be called a political party, but a bunch
>of opinion-pollsters (before getting into power) and
>status quo (multinational financecapital) defenders (once in power).
>
>The pattern is the same in Hungary.  I haven't even heard the MP
>to say stuff like "renationalisation under full democratic control"

Thank God...


Vamossy Karcsi
+ - Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 02:11 PM 5/16/97 +1000, George Anthony wrote:
>Gabor Fencsik wrote:
>
>> Huh?  The question was whether it is fair to describe the output of New
>> York Times correspondents as crass/ignorant/uninformed.
>
>No, not really.  My proposition was that since I found many articles on
>Central-Eastern Europe from the NYT "naive/analytically shallow/factually
>deficient/crassly ignorant of other peoples' interests let alone feelings"
>I consider the paper's fame overrated.  It is only Gabor's misrepresentation
>of my stand that makes is read as if I had tarred all NYT correspondents
>with the same brush.
>

Fortunately for all of us, there are a number of newspapers (and news
sources) available to the inquiring person.  Most of us also  read the
newspaper most conveniently available and the one that also covers our local
area (it would do me little good to read about the goings on at  Brisbane,
AU's city council meeting).  So let's agree to this:  there are good and
poor papers everywhere, the local ones more useful than remote ones.  OK?

As far as the Times is concerned, I am an avid reader, even though sometimes
I find its political leaning to be at odds with my own.  They have a superb
team of reporters, they dig better and deeper than most for their stories
and the backgrounds.  As far as the "articles on Central-Eastern Europe from
the NYT "naive/analytically shallow/factually deficient/crassly ignorant of
other peoples' interests let alone feelings"  --  I don't find that to be
the case.  Occasionally, they do get a thing or two wrong and they are quite
willing to stand corrected.  Mostly I find they represent a view of Central
Europe that is mainstream America's and one which, as a Hungarian-American I
find deficient.  On the other hand, I am sure that my view of problems in
the PacRim or the African continent are less informed and somewhat
simplistic compared to those who were born and raised in those regions.  As
the sole remaining superpower in the world, it is not easy to pay equal and
in-depth attention to every area, but we try and the Times does its best to
keep us informed.

Editorials and Opinions are just that, of course.  They are not news,
although some are newsworthy, because they shape public opinion or they
reflect an important decision-maker's view.

regards from New York

Charlie Vamossy
+ - Re: Who's Left in Hungary? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 12:51 AM 5/16/97 -0700, Gabor Fencsik wrote:

<snip>
>I would describe it as a system in flux, with five parties originally
>elected to Parliament in 1994, since grown to six because of a party
>split, and soon perhaps to grow to seven with another party in the process
>of tearing itself apart.  It's only about eight short years since Hungary
>had a multi-party system, and the parties are still in the process of
>self-definition.  Like everywhere else, the electorate has a huge
>floating component which shows up "undecided" in the opinion polls.
>Six parties are clearly too many, and a shake-out is inevitable in
>the long run.  This makes many Hungarian politicians panic-stricken,
>and often causes them to raise the volume of their rhetoric in a way
>that is baffling to those who don't live there.

Not all countries are heading for the American or British model of having
two political parties.  Mature democracies, such as Canada, can, and do,
have more than two major parties, as you well know.  We're having an
election on June 2nd and there are five major parties that will split the
vote and win parliamentary seats.  Of these parties, the Liberals,
Progressive Conservatives, and Reform are on the right, the Bloc (the
official opposition at the moment) is a mixed bag and exists only because
it wants independence for Quebec, and the New Democratic Party which is a
very mild social democratic party.  Of course, there is a plethora of other
parties, but they will not win any seats.  With five major political
parties it's possible, though very unlikely, that the seperatist Bloc would
win the most seats and form a minority government.  Hungary is not alone in
having baffling politics.

<snip>
>Such floating blocks of voters can do strange things, by the way.
>It seems that a large portion of the voters of the Front National
>in France used to vote for the Communists up until very recently.
>Just goes to show how little ideology matters when it comes to
>voting behavior.

You're right, but with ideology not playing such a strong role in people's
voting behaviour, there's nothing to stop this floating block from
supporting totalitarian parties.

<snip>
>Politics is not about solace.  Politics is a profession, or a trade,
>like plumbing or the law.  The parties are not "the same".  There are
>huge differences among them in terms of style, competence, imagination,
>the propensity for corruption, and a number of other attributes.  The
>same is true about plumbers and lawyers.  When you cast your vote, you
>are purchasing a service.  It behooves you to pay attention, and make
>a careful choice.  Otherwise you are likely to be shafted by unscrupulous
>operators.

Sorry, but politics is not like plumbing or the law.  In the professions
and trades people are trained and certified.  In politcs, the most
brilliant and the most ignorant have one vote.  And no, when I cast my
vote, I'm not purchasing a service.  I haven't yet subscribed to the
corporatist agenda.  Parliament is not WAL-MART but I have no doubt that
many people think it is.  And that's probably why they want their money
back.  That doesn't bode well for democracy.

Joe Szalai
+ - George! A first.... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

[.....]
>and people, even though I do not feel the need of regular -->> panegyrics
<<--
[.....].
>
>George Antony

George,

Please accept my sincerest thanks. Today, for the first time in all
these years on the Net somebody drove me to a dictionary.

I knew if I hang around with this group  eventually I will learn
something.

Bandi

P.S. HUNGARYcontent? none! sorry....
+ - Letter to the Minister of Interior (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear Colleagues,

As the underworld has penetrated the Hungarian tourist industry (restaurants,
taxis) I wrote the attached letter to the Minister of the Interior asking for
both new regulations and forceful enfocement. If you agree, you might also
want to write.

Best regards: Bela Liptak

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Kuncze Gabor, Belugyminiszter
)

Tisztelt Miniszter Ur!

A Magyar Lobbi egyik celja, hogy vedje a magyarsag jo hiret. Ahhoz, hogy ezt
sikerrel tehessuk, szukseges, hogy a "rossz hiunk" megalapozatlan legyen.

Azert fordulok Onhoz, mert az utobbi idoben olyan hirek jelentek meg a
vilagsajtoban (egyenlore csak Kanadaban), hogy a magyar vendeglok
kihasznaljak a nyugati turistakat. Tobbezer dollaros vacsora-szamlakrol,
eroszakos penzbehajtasrol szolnak a cikkek.

Egyes hirforrasok szerint kozeledunk ahhoz az allapothoz, hogy a Pestre
latogato turista kenyszerul a kovetsegehez fordulni vedelemert/ tanacsert. Az
alabbi vendeglo-listat, mint "elkerulendoket" allitotta ossze az egyik
budapesti kovetseg.

Muskatli Espresso  V.distict, Vaci utca 11
Fontana Cabaret  V.district, Vaci utca 11/A,11/B
Arany Barany Restaurant  V.district, Harmincad utca 4
Tropical Bar  V.district, Galamb utca
Pigalle Bar  VIII. district
Dreher Halaszcsarda

Nagyon kerem Miniszter Urat, hogy vizsgaltassa ki ezt a helyzetet es tegye
meg a szukseges intezkedeseket.

Megjegyzem meg, hogy a taxi-iparban magam is tapasztaltam  a turistak
kihasznalasat. Barataimat vittem at a Citadellatol a Nemzeti Galeriaba, s az
oraval RENDELKEZO mercedes magan-taxi ezert az utert $26-ot kert es kapott.
Kesobb, a Muegyetemen (ahol tanitottam) megkerdeztem, hogy mi a pesti
"taxi-helyzet" es a portan azt a tajekoztatast kaptam, hogy "csak a
666-666-ot tessek hivni, a tobbi mind lop!"

Ugy gondolom, hogy a fenti helyzeten nehany egyszeru rendorsegi rendelettel,
intezkedessel segiteni lehetne:

1) Csak az a vendeglo kaphasson Budapesten mukodesi engedelyt, amelyik az
etlapjan feltunteti az arakat.

2) Taxi-ora nelkuli taxi Budapesten nem kozlekedhet es a taxiora
kilometer-ara nem haladhatja me a megszabott maximumot.

A szabadsag es a dzsungel, a szabad-verseny es a rablas kozott meg kell vonni
a hatarvonalat! Nagyon kerem Miniszter Urat, hogy lepjen fel hazank jo
hirenek vedelmeben.

Tisztelettel: Liptak Bela
+ - Re: Vaclav Havel in the New York Times (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Gabor Fencsik wrote:

> Huh?  The question was whether it is fair to describe the output of New
> York Times correspondents as crass/ignorant/uninformed.

No, not really.  My proposition was that since I found many articles on
Central-Eastern Europe from the NYT "naive/analytically shallow/factually
deficient/crassly ignorant of other peoples' interests let alone feelings"
I consider the paper's fame overrated.  It is only Gabor's misrepresentation
of my stand that makes is read as if I had tarred all NYT correspondents
with the same brush.

> I supplied some
> counterexamples produced by some of the better known NY Times
> correspondents whose name happened to pop into mind just then.  There is
> nothing extraordinary about them: they are just professionals at the top
> of their game who know how to produce a service people are willing to buy.

Given my real stand, this devotional segment contributed very little to the
discussion.  Neither do I disagree with any of it, nor does it consitute
a refutation of my stand.


George Antony
+ - Re: George! A first.... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Andrew Rozsa wrote:

>  Today, for the first time in all
> these years on the Net somebody drove me to a dictionary.
>
> P.S. HUNGARYcontent? none! sorry....

On the contrary.  I think this snippet is quote topical for the discussion
on the relative difficulties of Hungarian and English.

Assuming that your mother tongue is Hungarian, an explanation of how you
managed to acquire such a wide English vocabulary would be quite enlightening.

George Antony (who cannot make the same claim)

AGYKONTROLL ALLAT AUTO AZSIA BUDAPEST CODER DOSZ FELVIDEK FILM FILOZOFIA FORUM GURU HANG HIPHOP HIRDETES HIRMONDO HIXDVD HUDOM HUNGARY JATEK KEP KONYHA KONYV KORNYESZ KUKKER KULTURA LINUX MAGELLAN MAHAL MOBIL MOKA MOZAIK NARANCS NARANCS1 NY NYELV OTTHON OTTHONKA PARA RANDI REJTVENY SCM SPORT SZABAD SZALON TANC TIPP TUDOMANY UK UTAZAS UTLEVEL VITA WEBMESTER WINDOWS