||Test - test - test (mind)
|| 9 sor
||Re: Civil Wars and Tribal Squabbles (mind)
|| 160 sor
||Re: The Trouble With Corporatism (mind)
|| 183 sor
||Re: Riding the tiger (mind)
|| 33 sor
||Re: Riding the tiger (mind)
|| 30 sor
||Corporatism and Fascism (mind)
|| 75 sor
||Re: Corporatism and Fascism (mind)
|| 11 sor
||Re: Propaganda! (mind)
|| 33 sor
||Re: Propaganda! (mind)
|| 30 sor
|+ - ||Test - test - test (mind)
Ignore this - it is a test - at least I hope the reason I am not getting
messages is just that no one is posting and not another major crash of the
mainframe at GWU.
Johanne L. Tournier
|+ - ||Re: Civil Wars and Tribal Squabbles (mind)
First and foremost, I would like to make clear that the lines Janos
was quoting from the History of Hungary, edited by Peter Sugar, Peter Hanak
and Tibor Frank, were actually written by Istvan Deak. And let me quote from
the introductory paragraphs of that chapter, entitled "The Revolution and
the War of Independence, 1848-1849."
"Because Hungary lost the War of Independence but won the peace that
followed, the revolution and the war of 1848-49 are the most celebrated and,
simultaneously, the most hotly debated events in the country's history.
Immediately following the War of Independence, the politically conscious
part of Hungarian society became divided to our day. For the last century
and a half, the Hungarian public and historians have been questioning when
and how the mistakes were made that led to military defeat by Austria:
whether at the beginning of the revolution, when Hungary went too far, or
perhaps not far enough, in her drive for self-determination; or in September
1849, when an initially peaceful revolution turned into a blood conflict; or
in April 1849, when the Hungarians proclaimed that the Habsburg dynasty had
forfeited its claim to the Hungarian Crown. Or perhaps the revolutionaries
had made no mistakes at all, and Hungary was simply the victim of
aggression. Nationalist spokesmen have hinted darkly at anti-Hungarian
machinations by the Vienna court, the liberal Austrian government, the
Czechs, the South Slavs, the Romanians, the Russian Tsar, and even Great
Britain; radicals have accused the reactionary and treacherous Hungarian
aristocracy and high clergy; orthodox Marxists, who identify the Hungarian
national cause with that of the international proletariat, have complained
of betrayal by the exploiting classes; and finally, conservatives have
blamed the rabble, as well as individual rabble-rousers, for ruining what
could have become a peaceful and gradual evolution. Even the more moderate
Hungarian historians have tended to assign praise or blame on the basis of
purely national considerations. The critics of Hungary, especially among its
neighbors, have used the same approach to arrive at exactly the opposite
conclusions. Every generation has judged the events of 1848-49 according to
its own *Weltanschauung,* and only in recent years have some Hungarian
historians come up with a more balanced judgment. They now see the Hungarian
events of 1848-49 as part and parcel of a great ecumenical European
upheaval, which put an end to one of the longest periods of relative
European peace. The 1848 revolutions, Hungary's among them, clearly
demonstrated the decline of the great conservative alliance that had
controlled Europe in the preceding decades, but it also demonstrated the
mutual incompatibility of the various European liberal-nationalist movements."
With this in mind let me try to sort out a few concepts. There seems
to me a confusion concerning terms like liberalism, conservatism, and
different degrees of national determination. We all know what the liberals
wanted: abolishing serfdom, eliminating any distinction between nobles and
commoners, expansion of the suffrage, establishment of a modern cabinet
headed by a prime minister and responsible for a popularly elected
parliament, freedom of press and speech, and so on and so forth. The
conservatives either wanted to conserve the absolutist regime of pre-1848
times or wanted a much less "revolutionary," "liberal" change in the
relationship between the ruler and his subjects.
When it comes to national self-determination it is an entirely
different issue: here the question was the exact relationship between Vienna
(the empire's central authority) and the empire's provinces, territories,
countries, whatever their name might have been. The deep-seated problem was
that liberalism was firmly attached to national demands and every time
Vienna felt that the Hungarian nationalist demands were beyond what the
Court was ready to grant, the liberal leaders of Hungary immediately
translated this as an attempt at eliminating the liberal achievements of the
revolution. The problem is that Janos, very much like Kossuth himself,
thinks that liberalism and nationalism are one and the same. The two may
have been linked but they are not the same.
Now, we can return to some of Janos's comments:
>Geee, 10,000 'nemzetor' (~national guard). Jelacic had 35,000 *south serbs*
>(courtasy of S.Stowe) when he crossed the Hungarian border, Windisch-Graetz
>had 70,000 when he crushed the revolution in Vienna and later entered in
But you see, the problem with all this is that the arming of the
National Guard preceded the moves of both Jelacic and Windischgraetz. And it
was indeed hard to fathom why it was necessary to arm these guards. After
all, there was a peaceful revolution and initially at least no enemies.
General enthusiasm prevailed even among the nationality leaders.
>In such a situation to rely solely on the word of the Emperor (or the Court),
>which was given 'admittedly under the gun', could have been considered
But again, one must ask, "suicide" in what respect? For the national
cause or for liberalism?
>I don't say the Hungarian government was not responsible for the armed
>conflict of 1848-49. But I am against the interpretation (represented
>by E.Balogh) which makes them primarily responsible for it. There
>was real danger to lose the constitutional rights (not only the
That's all very nice, but you have to prove that the Court wanted to
restore absolutism shortly after April 1848, and I don't think that you can
do that. Their primary concern was to hold the empire together.
>Finally I would like to ask E.Balogh for supportive facts that the court
>, by and large, excepted the Hungarian demands. The fact itself that
>the Emperor signed the April Laws is not such, as it contained demands
>unacceptable by the court for longer run.
I am not sure what other proofs you want. The court easily accepted
all the Hungarian demands when the Hungarian delegation from the Pozsony
Diet arrived in Vienna. On March 18 Batthyany was appointed prime minister
and Archduke Stephen, a Hungarian-born Habsburg, became plenipotentiary.
Jelacic was appointed ban of Croatia on March 23 but the court's reason for
appointing him was not that he hated Hungary but because he was loyal to the
court and at the same time he was a patriotic Croat. The court needed the
Croats if they wanted to hang on to the Italian provinces.
As for the April Laws they were signed in spite of some serious
constitutional problems. We already mentioned the palatine's competencies.
One can add the role of the "minister near his majesty," who dealt with
Austria and other foreign powers as a foreign minister. One could also
mention that the Hungarians refused to pay a penny toward the Austrian state
debt which was considerable. And, of course, there was the question of the
Hungarian army and its relation to the Austrian army. As Istvan Deak says,
"A monarchy consisting of two foreign services, two financial
administrations, and two armed forces was ungovernable. Therefore, it was
only a question of time before the Hungarians would either make some
concessions to sanity, secede from the monarchy, or go to war against
Austria." It is that simple, Janos. And Istvan Deak a few lines later says:
"Their nationalist ambitions ... and their fear that the monarchy might
collapse any day, prompted the Hungarian politicians to prepare for complete
independence." Again, it is that simple. From April on slowly but surely the
Hungarian politicians were preparing for independence. And finally, Deak
points out two very grave complicating factors: the Kingdom of Croatia and
its constitutional ties to Pest-Buda and the nationalities whose numbers
exceeded those of the Magyars. And the April Laws said absolutely nothing
about the nationalities, except that the language of the administration was
to be Hungarian.
>Also, why the constitutional righs were denied after the 'octroi'
Why? How can you even ask that? In Austrian eyes, Hungarian
liberalism/nationalism almost ruined a monarchy, which, I at least think,
had an important role to play in Central Europe. Therefore liberalism meant
the ruin of central authority. Of course, they were not going to restore the
liberal constitution (the April Laws) which, according to them, were the
cause of all trouble. As for the old feudal privileges, the court claimed
that Hungary forfeited its constititutional rights by rebelling against its
king and eventually dethroning him.
>Why Windisch-Graetz insisted to the unconditional surrender, when
>he recieved the peace mission sent by the Hungarian parlament during
>the winter 1848-49.
Everybody, including Kossuth, knew that the peace mission was doomed
to failure. First of all, Windidschgraetz was in the middle of a victorious
campaign and the defense of Buda and Pest was abandoned. Within a few days,
the imperial troops would be in the capital. Part of the government moved to
Debrecen already. Simply put, there was no reason for Windischgraetz to
negotiate. The negotiations should have been made much earlier. But if you
read a little bit further on the subject, Kossuth at least never really
wanted to negotiate. As he said in January 1849, before the peace delegation
went to see Windischgraetz: there is no hope of Windischgraets sitting down
and negotiating with the delegation of the "peace party," and therefore, he
had no objection to their mission.
|+ - ||Re: The Trouble With Corporatism (mind)
At 10:47 PM 1/29/97 GMT, Sam Stowe wrote:
>In article >, Joe Szalai
>>The ideology that dominates our age is not democracy, socialism,
>>or communism, but "corporatism". By corporatism I mean the development
>>large groups - not just big business and corporations but bureaucracies
>>interest groups of all kinds - that try to impose their agenda on society
>>and subvert the loyalties of their members from the common good.
>>Corporatism reduces civilization to the sum of its corporations, to the
>>of its interests. And in the process it becomes a profound denial of
>>everything that is actually positive in our history.
>Ever read Alexis De Tocqueville? Indicting anything above the individual
>level as inherently anti-democratic seems a touch indiscriminate, not to
No, I've not read De Tocqueville. And your comment shows no understanding
of what I wrote, just indiscriminate over reaction, as usual.
>>Corporatism everywhere is fundamentally anti-democratic. Its drive to
>>dominance produces weak governments, frayed social safety nets, an
>>workforce, a degraded environment, and a culture in which the individual
>>defined as a consumer or an employee. Even in government offices
>>are now described as "customers" or "clients". All of these are stages
>>the destruction of civilization.
>The term you seem to be groping for, I think, is "commodity fetishism."
>Here we arrive at a fundamental difference in our world views. Hegel's
>belief in historical progression toward some rationalistic human utopia
>and Vico and Spengler's belief in the eventual decay of civilizations into
>dystopia are two sides of the same determinist Cartesian coin. You
>encapsulate the quandary perfectly in this post -- if we cannot have
>utopia, we will have its opposite. I rather like Sir Karl Popper's view
>that perhaps human history is largely full of sound and fury signifying
>nothing and the totalitarian struggle to invest it with any meaning- or
>truth-bearing structure is doomed to frustration. It means I can spend
>more time listening to my jazz collection.
Hegel, Vico, Spengler, and Popper, have precious little to do with my
comments. Name dropping is not the same as understanding. You, like so
many others, are incapable of recognizing ideology as such when we are in
its grip. Your desire to spend more time listening to your jazz collection
indicates that you've accepted the passivity that corporatism produces in
individuals. And, although you've accepted passivity, it irritates you and
your only "out" is to demonize "the other side" (my views in this case) or
to seek new ideologies. You're content enough with corporatism not to seek
new ideologies but it is a dead end. You're not into Scientology, are you?
>>And why have we been reduced to being merely customers or clients? The
>>reason is because we've accepted that the basic language of public
>>is a language which denies the possibility of the public good. A
>>which de-legitimizes the democratic state and the role of citizens. And
>>you accept that language, and it seems that most people do, then you are
>>effect committing suicide.
>I think you hit on something worth noting here -- the degree to which
>one's command of the particular language-game in play (I use this in a
>Wittgensteinian sense and am not implying any frivolity) empowers one as
>an actor. We must make very careful choices in the words we use in public
>discourse. Language is powerful mojo.
It sure is! And not only should we be careful of our own words but we
should challenge other people's words. Government bureaucrats who call you
a "customer" or "client" should be challenged. The dictionary indicates
that "client" is someone who is "dependent" or a "follower". When that's
the relationship that you've accepted vis-a-vis your government, it's over.
Then you're no longer an actor. You're just a puppet, a fantoccini.
>>If you, as a citizen, allow your government to talk to you about customer
>>services, then it's all over. There's nothing left to discuss. You
>>shouldn't even bother to vote. Because if you can't get the language
>>if you allow them to describe you and the public interest in a language
>>which denies the public interest, the debate is over.
>Better a customer than a servant. At least when they refer to me as a
>customer, it reminds the bastards that they have an obligation to treat me
>with some degree of consideration. Still, I agree with your overall point
>-- better they should refer to us as citizens. But that definition has
>gotten worn out in spots. All of the implications of inalienable
>individual rights still shine, but the equally important parts about
>reciprocal obligations have vanished for the most part.
No. I don't want to be a customer or a servant to the government. I want
to be a participant. However, given our corporatist ideology, that's not
easy. "Reason" is now used to suppress disinterested individual
participation in decision making. As a society, we've been neutered,
"fixed", as it were.
>>Getting the language right is as critical as finding the time to
>>as a citizen. Democracy is language and participation.
>Thank you, Herr Habermas. Would you sign my copy of "Theory of
>>Language and participation are tied to the idea of rejecting false
>>individualism. The idea that reigns today - that individualism is
>>away from society as opposed to participating in society. That
>>individualism is the freedom not to be there - to go on holiday, to go
>>skiing - when in fact individualism is about participation and
>>The more you participate, the more you're an individual.
>Make up your mind, Joe. Either corporatism or individualism is the enemy.
>You're trying to take on both in the same post. It seems like you're
>trying to re-state in much more dramatic terms something I've said over
>and over again here -- too much of anything is bad for you.
Corporatism is the ideology and "false" individualism is the problem.
Corporatism produces false individualism. False individualism means you're
free to do anything that's of no real importance, such as you being able to
listen to your jazz collection more often. I mean, who cares? What does it
matter? However, when it comes to really important things, we're not nearly
as free to make decisions as you'd like to believe. But don't believe me.
Go by your own experience. For example, didn't the Americans elect Clinton
four years ago because, among other things, he wanted to introduce universal
medicare? He was democratically elected, was he not? And four years later
he was re-elected. But what happened to the people's democratic decision to
have medicare? What happened to that "important" decision? Was it
jettisoned by one of the large, powerful, "interest groups" in society that
was looking after it's own interest and not that of the public good? You
bet! And most Americans accept that an interest group can "reasonably"
>>That's how a real democracy, a humanist democracy is built. Perhaps
>>more interested in the Super Bowl.
>I do know now why the chicken crossed the road, if that's what you're
Yeah. That's all I wanted to know. That's all I need to know. Now at
least I'll have more time to spend in my garden.
>>I'm sorry if the above ideas seem a bit disjointed.
>Maybe this should be your permanent sig.
It is. You just have trouble reading the subtext.
>> A government of the masses. Authority derived through mass
>>meeting or any other form of direct expression. Results in mobocracy.
>>Attitude toward property is communistic... negating property rights.
>>Attitude toward law is that the will of the majority shall regulate,
>>whether it is based upon deliberation or governed by passion,
>>prejudice, and impulse, without restraint or regard to consequences.
>>Result is demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, anarchy.
>> -- U. S. Army Training Manual No. 2000-25 (1928-1932),
>> since withdrawn.
>This is great propaganda! Did you make this up on your own or is it actual
>disinformation from the period itself?
You're scared silly that one of your venerable institutions is not what it
seems to be. By the way, did you see the footage of one of the hazing
"ceremonies" in the American army this past week? Brutal! Disgusting!
P.S. Happy Groundhog Day!
"I played by the rules of politics as I found them."
Richard M. Nixon
|+ - ||Re: Riding the tiger (mind)
on Jan 31 12:49:50 EST 1997 in HUNGARY #901:
> I can't quite believe that either
>Ferenc or Janos are so ignorant as not to know that Poland DID disappear
>from the map of Europe for about 150 years.
Yes, but we were talking about long-term consequences.
> Yes, Poland was resurrected at the end of World War I ...
That is what I meant. OK, perhaps not larger than ever...
>Poland lost most of its non-Polish territories and some more.
So did Hungary. So where is Poland worse off today?
>It is another matter that the
>western territories Poland received were economically more developed than
>the territories she lost in the East to Russia.
>Still, it is hard to
>reconcile yourself that the historical territories of your country are no
>longer there ...
This is true of Hungary as well.
>...and you were "shifted" a bit in this or that direction.
> Eva Balogh
Perhaps Poland DID have it better, after all, won't you agree?
|+ - ||Re: Riding the tiger (mind)
At 02:54 PM 2/2/97 -0500, Ferenc Novak wrote:
>Perhaps Poland DID have it better, after all, won't you agree?
No, Polish national life suffered terribly during those 150 years
when she was was cut into three parts. The Kulturkampf of German Poland, the
Russification attempts on the part of Russia, just to mention two serious
problems. Two protracted revolutionary wars against Russia only to be
crushed and finally even semblance of constitutionalism disappeared in
Russian-dominated Poland. And this is while the Austro-Hungarian Compromise
gave the best possible opportunity for Hungarian development.
OK, Poland was resurrected but its resurrection was a most
unforeseen event: for Poland it really didn't matter whether the Entente won
the war or the Central Powers. In either case her independent existence was
in jeopardy. Luckily for Poland a most unlikely event occurred: both Russia
and the Central Powers collapsed as a result of the war which allowed Poland
to be reunited and start an independent existence. The beginnings
politically and economically were very rough because of the different
economic and political developments in the different Polands. The Polish
political leadership was always deeply aware that the country stood between
Germany and Russia and the fear of a new disappearance was always on their
minds. And not without reason: the fourth partition of Poland took place in
1939. During the war, more six million Poles died and at the end, Russia
reimposed her will on her despite her being on the side of the victors.
No, I don't think that Hungary's sufferings and losses can be
compared to those of Poland.
|+ - ||Corporatism and Fascism (mind)
In 1989, did Hungary go from "communism" to "fascism"? And if it did, who
would have noticed?
I think it's important not to confuse nazism with fascism. Although both
"ism's" had lots in common, they also had differences. What interests me is
that there's a clearer link between fascism and corporatism than there is
between nazism and corporatism.
Fascism is from the Italian "fascio", which means groups. And corporatism
is also about groups. Late last century there were arguments among the
proponents of corporatism whether or not such a system would be state,
economic, or society centred. The only important area of agreement was,
that in any event, it would be group centred and interest centred. The
public good was suppressed. The interest of the group(s) became paramount.
Mussolini's Italy was about efficiency, professionalism, management by
experts, leadership by great men, and, of course, market forces. Sounds a
lot like today, no?
In the January 5th, 1935 issue of The Economist, an article was published in
which the author was not totally enamoured by the changes in Italy. In the
article "The Corporative State" the author writes:
"... Thus it is fair to say that corporations have existed, at least on
paper, since 1926. To maintain, therefore, that corporations and
"corporatism" are now being introduced for he first time and that a new
system must be given a fair chance of "making good" is certainly putting the
matter in too favourable a light. The Act of 1934 is not an innovation, but
a link in a lengthy chain. ...
"... There is no doubt that large-scale strikes such as are known in
England, France, and the United States have vanished in Italy. But is this
to be explained by the general contentment of the Italian worker? It seems
much more probable that strikes have disappeared because the free expression
of workers' and employers' opinion has been suppressed. This is due to the
method of nomination of the Fascist syndicate leaders who are, in effect,
appointed or approved by the Government. Indeed, the officials of the
regime make no secret of it. Signor Rossoni has spoken as follows;-
The syndicalist leaders of the syndicates
should remain what they are, blackshirts
appointed by the Government to direct the
syndicates. (Lavoro d'Italia, Jan. 15, 1929).
"As it is these leaders who represent the workers in the new corporations,
working-class opinion is, in effect, not represented at all.
"... Other Fascist creations are intended to strengthen certain
monoplies.... It naturally did no more than stabilise vested interests.
"The new corporations have behind them, therefore, an unprepossessing
background of deflated wages, protectionism and monopoly. Signor Mussolini
himself nominates the members of the corporations, presides at their
meetings, fixes their agenda, and decides what questions shall be studied by
them. There is no question of groups of producers meeting to discuss
subjects of common interest, but merely of bodies to which the Government is
willing to delegate a part of it powers, while maintaining a strict control
of their activity. Consumers are, to all practical purposes, unrepresented
on the corporations. Broadly speaking, these seem to be the features which
will continue to characterise Corporative Italy."
This was written before WWII.
Today, corporatism looks much more professional. And yet, training,
meritocracy, and the pyramidial organization of our structures looks very
familiar. Do we still have a voice? And is The Economist not casting a
critical eye on corporatism today because it too has become just another
interest group looking out for its' own interest?
"Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development
of humanity, quite apart from political considerations of the moment,
believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace."
|+ - ||Re: Corporatism and Fascism (mind)
Joe Szalai wrote:
> In 1989, did Hungary go from "communism" to "fascism"?
> And if it did, who
> would have noticed?
Every observer with a rudimentary knowledge of some basic definitions.
|+ - ||Re: Propaganda! (mind)
In article >, Ferenc Novak,
crypto-Slovak, > writes:
>Subject: Re: Propaganda!
>From: Ferenc Novak >
>Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1997 16:48:08 -0500
on Jan 30 20:47:33 EST 1997 in HUNGARY #900:
>>You can always tell the difference between me and Janos -- I'm the one
>>English is intelligible.
>This is unfair, and you know it, Sam. Shame on you. And think about
>his English is probably far better than your Hungarian.
I've never pretended to be able to speak fluent Hungarian, Frank. And I'm
really not worried about what a gay-baiting buttwipe thinks is fair or
not, particularly a gay-baiting buttwipe who has very recently made it
clear that he considers physical handicaps an indication of moral
inferiority. I didn't get our German friend, Miklos' post, but it's
typical crap from him. I'm surprised he wasn't haunting my e-mail like
usual. In case he's still listening -- next time with feeling, pal.
"Missionaries and cannibals
make perfect couples..."
-- Paul Theroux
|+ - ||Re: Propaganda! (mind)
In article >, "Johanne L. Tournier"
>Sam uses ridicule to belittle someone with whom he disagrees
>and ideologically. His comment has very little to do with Janos's actual
>fluency in English, which I would judge is excellent. Furthermore, I
>certainly don't feel that Janos' views are in any way extreme - more like
>small 'c' conservative - but to an LBJ liberal like Sam, that is
>Johanne L. Tournier
You're just mad at me because I made fun of Ayn Rand and called her and
her philosophy repulsive. Janos is also in the habit of blaming secret
cabals for conspiring against Hungary for the past century. I guess for a
Ralph Reed-worshipping militia type like La Tournier, that's mainstream
politics, much like blowing up federal court houses along with hundreds of
innocent civilians. 'Tis indeed a brave new world for Johanne, Frank Novak
and the rest of the Moral Majority.
"Missionaries and cannibals
make perfect couples..."
-- Paul Theroux