------------------------------------------ -- EZ A SZÁM CSAK TEXT FORMÁBAN LÉTEZIK -- ------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 15 Mar 91 22:48:19 EST Subject: *** FORUM *** #173 Tartalomjegyzek: ---------------- Felado : pvoros@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Temakor : Competitive Advantage of Nations =============================================== Felado : pvoros@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Beerkezett: Fri Mar 15 09:05:53 EST 1991 Temakor : Competitive Advantage of Nations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kedves Leirer Laszlo! Eloszor is koszonet hozzaszolasodert a Porter-konyvvel kapcsolatban. Termeszetes, hogy erdekel a konyvvel szemben felvetett kritika. Nos, a stilust illetoen ("the prose ... is turbid and turgid ..." - szegenyes nyelvtudasom, kulonosen, ami a mellekneveket/jelzoket illeti, ujabb ket szoval bovult - kulon koszonet! Turbid = zavaros es turgid = dagalyos ...), szerintem ez izles kerdese, nekem speciel tetszik, ahogyan ir, mivel konnyen kovetheto es ertheto (en szinesnek, mintsem dagalyosnak erzem); teny, hogy nem egy egzakt tudomany matematikai tisztasagu erv- es eszkozrendszeret vonultatja fel - amivel a kozgazdasagtan tobbe- kevesbe nem is rendelkezik. A kozgazdasagi analizisnek is, mint pl. az (elo)vilag analizisenek is tobb komplexitasi foka van; pl. a biologia egy par lepcsofokkal komplexebb szinten foglalkozik az (elo)vilaggal, mint a kemia, ami megint csak joval komplexebb szinten elemez, mint a fizika, stb. (Kemiai-biologiai parhuzam -> Lehet, hogy a periodusos rendszerbol meg a kovalens/ionos-kotesbol, a Van-der- Vaals erovel, stb. stb. le lehet vezetni azt, hogy hogyan alakul ki a DNS vagy RNS es aztan egy tulipan vagy egy elefant, de azert ez a vilag jelensegeinek kulonbozo komplexitasi fokon valo vizsgalatat jelenti...) Ennek analogiaja a gazdasagi elet elemzesenel is megvan: Az un. mikrookonomia foglalkozik a gazdasagi elet (mondjuk) "kemiajaval" (pl. mi huzodik a kereslet- kinalati gorbek mogott), (a makrookonomiaval - amit a magam reszerol a legkevesbe tartok "tudomany"-nak a kozgazdasagtanon belul - nem tudnek parhuzamot talalni, az egy nagy humbug ...); de pl. az un. "Industrial Organization" cimu ag mar inkabb a "biologiai" komplexitasi szinten foglalkozik a gazdasagi elettel -> by the way, Porter is a kozgazdasagtan ezen agat-szintjet muveli; ez az ag az un. "Structure, Conduct, Performance" elmeleti fogalom-harmas osszefuggesrendszereben viszgalja a gazdasagot. Mellesleg ez a kozgazdasagtan egyik olyan aga, ahol a legtisztabban mutattak ki a monopoliumok tarsadalmi karossagat (es ez alol az allaspont alol Porter sem kivetel ...) Sokszor felvetett kifogas (es nem csak Porter konyve ellen) a kozgazdasagtanon belul a dolgok rendszerszemleletu, "kibernetikus" vizsgalata. A gazdasag meg statikusan szemlelve is annyira bonyolult vizsgalatot igenyel (amivel azert magaban is jelentos eredmenyeket ertek el Marshall-tol kezdve Friedman-ig), hogy a rendszerszemleletu megkozelites meg annyira sem szamit "tudomanyosnak", mint a statikus. (A kibernetika eleg nepszeru volt a 50-es evek vegen es a 60-as evekben - otthon a kozgazdasagtannal maradva ld. pl. Liska Tibor Okonosztat-jat -, azota valahogy erosen csokkent a nepszerusege; pedig szerintem eleg erdekes es igeretes terulet, a franya mernokok azert ma is hasznaljak pl. a Systems Control-ban, stb.) Igaza van Thurow-nak annak illetoen, hogy reszleteit tekintve lenyegeben semmi uj nincs a Porter-konyvben. Ami szerintem uj benne, az egy szintezis letrehozasa, egy uj osszefugges-rendszer kikristalyositasa (ill. arra tett kiserlet), ld. "diamond" ... Termeszetesen nem Porter talalta fel a spanyolviaszt pl. az amerikai penzugyi rendszer rovidlatosaganak karos voltarol, vagy az oktatas fontossagat illetoen, stb. A gazdasagi elet "puzzle"- janak darabjait termeszetesen nem o talalta ki (meg). Ezeket azonban kepes volt ugy osszerakni, hogy egy kicsit tobbet lathatunk (az esetleg nem is letezo?) "big picture"-bol. Az elmelet elorejelzeseit/joslatait illetoen (ld. ujra az evolucio-analogiat Thurow irasaban: "...The closer one looks, however, the less predictive power this theory, like its counterpart in the study of evolution, seems to have. No one viewing Homo sapiens 100,000 years ago would have predicted the species' dominance today. No biologist can say precisely what characteristics caused a species to become extinct, since there is almost always some other species with exactly those characteristics that did not die out...") egy kevesbe fontos megjegyzes, de ez jutott eloszor eszembe. Attol meg, hogy az evolucio-elmelet alapjan nem lehetett volna mondjuk 100 ezer evvel ezelott megjosolni a Homo Sapiens uralkodova valasat a Foldon, nos ettol meg (legalabbis az en szememben) nem csokken az evolucio-elmelet helyessege. Ezzel jogosan vetheted fel, hogy egy tudomany annyiban "tudomany", amennyiben igaznak bizonyulo elorejelzesekkel tud elorukkolni. Az elet azonban sajnos nagyon osszetett (legalabbis a vizsgalat egy bizonyos melysegi szintje utan), a valtozok szama tul nagy, maga a rendszer allando valtozasban-mozgasban van. (Vagy ahogy Rejto Jeno mondta a "Szoke ciklon"-ban: A sors olyan, mint egy reszeges szabasz: mikor belevag a szovetbe, meg nem lehet tudni: felolto lesz-e belole vagy nadrag ...) Megint csak felvetheto persze az a kerdes, hogy akkor egyaltalan tudomanynak lehet-e tekinteni ezeket a "diszciplinakat" - es pl. a fizika irant messze jobban erdeklodo barataim allandoan bizonygatjak, hogy bizony ennyire-meg-annyira le lehet asni a vilag jelensegeinek a melyere; azt azonban nem tudom elkepzelni (vagy szomoru lenne odaig eljutni?), hogy egyszer majd teljes egzaktsaggal (ld. -> fizikai szintu magyarazat), mondjak majd el, hogy pl. a kecsua (inka) indianoknak miert van "sas"orra, vagy hogy a magyar nepzeneben miert szol ugy a hegedu, ahogy sehol masutt ... Mit akarok roviden mondani mindezzel? Azt szeretnem hangsulyozi, hogy maga a vizsgalando targy annyira bonyolult (elovilag/gazdasag), hogy barmilyen elmelet, amely a dolgok gyakorlati szinten ertheto magyarazatara torekszik, onkentelenul elvont, absztrakt - ebben nincs semmi uj. Megfigyeleseket, kiserleteket folytatnak a tudosok/kutatok (vagy laikusok, "for that matter"), fel-felbukkan az osszrakosdi egy-egy ujabb darabja. Megint masok megprobaljak ezeket osszerakosgatni. Egyik a masik nelkul nem lehet meg. Es persze ez nem csak szigoruan veve a kozgaszdasagtanra vonatkozik: ui. a gazdasagi elet jelensegeit mas tarsadalomtudomanyok is vizsgaljak (tobbek kozott a szociologia, pszichologia,stb.) Amik persze megint csak ennek a szerteagazo teruletnek egy mas szemuvegen at torteno vizsgalatat vegzik es idealis esetben ujra ossze lehetne rakni egy meg magasabb komplexitasu "kepet". No, hogy ujra visszaterjek a leveledben idezett Thurow-irasra: szerintem a konyv alapgondolata nem az, amit o emlit (ti." Mr. Porter preaches the economic equivalent of survival of the fittest.) Persze ez a gondolat ott van a konyvben, de Porter ennek a kerdesnek fokent a m a s i k oldalaval foglalkozik -> ti. a "kornyezeti" hatasok (ld. a "diamond" negy osszetevoje + kormany-es az altalam a konyv-osszefoglaloban nem emlitett "veletlen esemenyek" szerepe) rendszerezese a vizsgalat targya. (Ezt azert mar maga a cim is mutatja: ha a "survival of the fittest" lenne a fo tema, akkor pl. Competitive Advantage of F i r m s lenne Competitive Advantage of N a t i o n s helyett ... Szo se rola, Porter elso jelentos konyvenek eppen ez volt a temaja, a cim pedig "Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors", 1980) Hogy meg mindig a konkretumoknal maradjak: "All of Mr. Porter's findings predict that Olivetti cannot be successful in Italy, yet it is." (Itt arra utal Thurow, hogy Porter szerint komoly hazai versenytarsak nelkul nehezen maradhat versenykepes egy vallalat) 1. A kivetel erositi a szabalyt (ezt csak zarojelben jegyeztem meg, de:) 2. Porter sehol nem irja, hogy esetunkben az Olivetti nem lehet sikeres Olaszorszagban - amit o fontosnak tart az az, hogy vajon sikeres-e a vilagpiacon; 3. ha pl. a holland Philips-re, a francia Thompson-ra, vagy a nemet Grundig-ra gondolsz, akkor azert van talan nemi igazsag Porter gondolatmeneteben. Meg csak egy dolgot az Olivettirol: kivancsi vagyok, hogy megerik-e az ezredfordulot (es persze hogyan) az amerikai es japan (ill. altalaban a tavol-keleti) vetelytarsakkal szemben ... Persze ez is csak reszletkerdes. Egy masik. "Japan and Italy are the two countries with the largest post-World War II increase in export. The former has a government organized to help its industries; the latter has one organized, it seems, in effect to disorganize its economy." Nos, Porter azert probal magyarazot talalni erre a kerdesre is. Az o megoldasa azt sugallja, hogy a japanok a szervezettseget inkabb "toleralo" (igenylo) iparagakban lettek sikeresek (ld. pl. robotika, autoipar, stb.), szemben az olaszokkal, akik az allam impotenciajara kenytelenek voltak ugy reagalni (ld. "selective disadvantage"), hogy azokban az iparagakban lettek menok, ahol ez a korulmeny nem volt hatrany (ld. kis- es kozepes meretu vallalatok, rendkivuli rugalmassag, stb. -> sikeres iparagak pl. az (ipari) design, divattal kapcsolatos teruletek, stb.) O.K. Elismerem, hogy garanciakat Porter rendszere sem nyujt egy orszag szamara sem; de azert iranytukent szolgalhat a gazdasagi eletben valo eligazodashoz. Meg egy reszletkerdes Nagy-Britannia hanyatlasat illetoen: "...As Mr. Porter's analysis of Britain illustrates, decline does not within itself contain the seeds of regeneration. Those seeds must come from elsewhere, and neither Mr. Porter nor any of the other writers toiling in these fields knows where that elsewhere is to be found..." Szerintem a Thatcher-i valtozasok pozitiv oldalanak (-> "seeds of regeneration") nagyon is sok koze van a Porter-fele gondolatmenethez (allami monopoliumok privatizalasa es jo esetben feldarabolasa, vallalatok szerepenek novekedese az oktatasban- tovabbkepzesben, adoterhek csokkentese -> motivacio novekedese, a monopolhelyzetukkel vakon visszaelo szakszervezetek megtorese egyertelmuen a termelekenyseg novekedeset segiti. Persze a kep itt sem egyertelmuen idilli: a kulfoldi befektetesek nagy resze mogott az alacsony berek allnak (!), a reprivatizalt volt allami monopolcegek meg mindig lenyegeben monopoliumok, a verseny sok iparagban hianyzik, a vedelem-tamogatas meg mindig szeleskoru, stb. Ezek azonban a Porter konyveben sem mint pozitivumok merulnek fel. (Amerika esete is hasonlo - es ezt azert Porter sem tagadja ...) Az pedig, hogy a politikai fomuftik ebbol az egeszbol mit mondanak el a nagykozonsegnek, az a kozgazdaszokon sajnos mar nemigen mulik, arra nekik nincs befolyasuk, ok legfeljebb tanacsokat adhatnak. (Es hogy arra is mennyire figyelnek oda, arrol hadd mondjak el egy "negativ" hatter-reszletet Porter-rol: tagja volt annak a Reagan elnok altal osszehivott "President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness" nevu bizottsagnak; a bizottsag egyik leginkabb hangsulyozott tanacsaval homlokegyenest ellenkezoen, a 80-as evekben szinte teljesen lealltak a szovetsegi kartell hivatal, a Federal Trade Commission, un. antitrust rendelkezeseinek betartasaval -> kovetkezmeny ld. "merger-mania of the 1980s", Boesky, Milken es a tobbi csibesz botranyai). Ha mar a politikusoknal tartunk: nem emlekszem mar ki irt arrol, hogy erdekes, elgondolkodtato (es szomoru ...) az, hogy egy csomo fontos gazdasagi-politikai kerdesben az erosen kozepszeru tanacsadokkal korulvett, jobboldali/konzervativ politikusoknak volt rendre igaza az utobbi 10-20 evben. (Reagan, Bush, Thatcher, stb.) Nos lehet, hogy maguk a tanacsadok es a politikusok kozepszeruek, de altalaban olyan, mar evtizedekkel korabban kijegecesedett ideologiak kepviseloi(kent tuntetik fel magukat), amelyek egyszeruen igaznak bizonyulnak (es amelyeknek szerzoi altalaban mar messze nem nevezhetok kozepszerueknek ...) Kitero: a "konzervativ" szonak szerintem magaban nem kene pejorativnak lennie, ugyanis a szo a "to conserve"-bol (ill. ennek nyilvan a latin valtozatabol) ered, aminek jelentese "meg- oriz", "meg-tart" valamit, ami esetleg megtartando (sokszor persze sajnos messze nem csak azt ...) Vegul, ami Thurow es a Te kovetkeztetesedet illeti: "...What we need is what we don't have: a President willing to tell the people that the news from the competitiveness-productivity front does not bode well for our future standard of living [ezt hivjak a pszichologiaban "denial"-nak]. What we don't have is a political process that would then support a President in changing what must be changed. [Azt hiszem Thurow itt - tipikus liberalis modra - feluton megall a kovetkeztetesek levonasaban. Mi a helyzet azzal a melyen gyokerezo gazdasagi strukturaval, amely a monopoliumok kialakulasanak melegagya? Vagy a korporaciok es a kormany hatalmi osszefonodasaval?]..." Ketlem, hogy egyszeruen csak egy jo elnok hianyzik az USA-nak, aki nem hazudik; a politikusok egyszeruen "definicio-szeruen" ilyenek: ellenorzes nelkul hazudnak-csalnak-lopnak, mindent megtesznek a hatalomert -> eppen ezert van szukseg a beepitett checks-and-balances rendszerre. Hogy ez utobbi itt Amerikaban esetleg se nem csekkol, se nem balanszol az 1. megiteles es foleg osszehasonlitas kerdese; es 2. egy ujabb hosszas elemzes targya lehetne. Azt viszont nem egeszen ertem mi koze a Porter-konyvnek a Te comment-edhez << Mi a helyzet azzal a melyen gyokerezo gazdasagi strukturaval, amely a monopoliumok kialakulasanak melegagya? Vagy a korporaciok es a kormany hatalmi osszefonodasaval? >> Az teny ugyan hogy o nem pejorative hasznalja a "korporaciok" szot/fogalmat, de azert pl. a monopoliumok szerepet (ahogy ezt mar korabban irtam) o sem tartja enyhen szolva tul pozitivnak. Nem tudom, mit ertesz "liberalis"-on, ezt megint csak kovetkezetesen pejorativ jelzokent hasznalod; ha ezen a szabadversenyes piaci rendszer elfogadasat (nem mindenhatosagat: abban ugyanis a kozgazdaszok kozott is eleg szeleskoru egyetertes van, hogy tobb olyan eset van, amikor a piac egyszeruen nem mukodik optimalisan a tarsadalom egesze szempontjabol. Ennek az egyik klasszikus esete az un. externalitasok esete: itt roviden arrol van szo, hogy a piacon megfigyelt kinalati gorbe - private supply curve - elter a tarsadalmi kinalati gorbetol - social supply curve - , olyan koltsegek is felmerulnek a termeles soran, mint pl. kornyezetvedelmi hatasok koltsege, amelyeket nem kozvetlenul a termelok viselnek. A piac kudarcanak (market failure) egy masik tipikus esete az a kozjavakkal (public goods) kapcsolatos. Pl. tegyuk fel, hogy egy hid hasznalataert vagy fizetni kell vagy nem. A hid megepulte utan maganak a hidhasznalatnak a hatarkoltsege lenyegeben nulla, igy a hidpenz kivetesevel a hid kapacitasanak kihasznalatlansagabol eredo tarsadalmi veszteseg nagyobb, mint a hidpenzbol szarmazo nyereseg. Egy szo mint szaz: Meg a kozgazdaszok kozul is ugy gondolja a tobbseg, hogy a piac sem mindenhato.); tehat, ha a "liberalison" a szabadversenyes piaci rendszer elfogadasat erted, es ez nem szimpatikus Neked, akkor meg az olyan rendkivuli (es nem-mainstream) kozgazdaszokat is "eliteled", mint pl. John Kenneth Galbraith ... Meg ha errol is van szo, abban sincs persze semmi baj, ez szived joga es valoszinuleg nem vagy egyedul ezzel... Mert, ahogy az Economist-vs.-The Nation-nel kapcsolatban irtad nemreg: a dolgokat felulrol is, alulrol is lehet nezni, egyutt pedig talan egeszsegesebb az ember szellemi taplalkozasa es ebben melyen egyetertunk. (Ezert is irtam az egyik resz ismertetesenel, hogy az altalad korabban emlitett tovabbi alternativ sajto kiadvanyok ismerteteset szivesen latnam a Forum-on...) Udvozlettel Voros Peter ^Z ************************************************************************* Kedves Forumozok! Kovetkezzen az utolso resz a Porter-konyvrol; ez egy konkret esettanulmany (kivonata), amely az olasz keramia csempe ipar (! ceramic tile) kialakulasat/tortenetet irja le, es ezen keresztul mutatja be a "national diamond" kialakulasat/mukododeset. Koszonom a turelmeteket a hosszura nyult konyvismerteto- sorozattal kapcsolatban. How the Diamond Works: The Italian Ceramic Tile Industry In 1987, Italian companies were world leaders in the production and export of ceramic tiles, a $10 billion industry. Italian producers, concentrated in and around the small town of Sassuolo in the Emilia-Romagna region, accounted for about 30% of world production and almost 30% of world exports. The Italian trade surplus that year in ceramic tiles was about $1.4 billion. The development of the Italian ceramic tile industry's competitive advantage illustrates how the diamond of national advantage works. Sassuolo's sustainable competitive advantage in ceramic tiles grew not from any static or historical advantage but from dynamism and change. sophisticated and demanding local buyers, strong and unique distribution channels, and intense rivalry among local companies created constant pressure for innovation. Knowledge grew quickly from continuous experimentation and cumulative production experience. Private ownership of the companies and loyalty to the community spawned intense commitment to invest in the industry. Tile producers benefited as well from a highly developed set of local machinery suppliers and other supporting industries, producing materials, services, and infrastructure. The presence of world-class, Italian-related industries also reinforced Italian strength in tiles. Finally, the geographic concentration of the entire cluster supercharged the whole process. Today foreign companies compete against an entire subculture. The organic nature of this system represents the most sustainable advantage of Sassuolo's ceramic tile companies. The Origins of the Italian industry Tile production in Sassuolo grew out of the earthen-ware and crockery industry, whose history traces back to the thirteenth century. Immediately after World War II, there were only a handful of ceramic tile manufacturers in and around Sassuolo, all serving the local market exclusively. Demand for ceramic tiles within Italy began to grow dramatically in the immediate postwar years, as the reconstruction of Italy triggered a boom in building materials of all kinds. Italian demand for ceramic tiles was particularly great due to the climate, local tastes, and building techniques. Because Sassuolo was in a relatively prosperous part of Italy, there were many who could combine the modest amount of cap and necessary organizational skill to start a tile co. In 1955, there were 14 Sassuolo area tile companies; by 1962, there were 102. The new tile companies benefited from a local pool of mechanically trained workers. The region around Sassuolo was home to Ferrari, Maserati, Lamborghini, and other technically sophisticated companies. As the tile industry began to grow and prosper, many engineers and skilled workers gravitated to the successful companies. The Emerging Italian Tile cluster Initially, Italian tile producers were dependent on for sources of raw materials and production tech. In the 1950s, the principal raw mat used to make tiles were kaolin (white) clays. Since there were red- but no white-clay deposits near Sassuolo, Italian producers had to import the clays from the United Kingdom. Tile-making equipment was also imported in the 1950s and 1960s: kilns from Germany, America, and France; presses for forming tiles from Germany. Sassuolo tile makers had to import even glazing machines. Over time, the Italian tile producers learned how to modify imported equipment to fit local circumstances: red versus white clays, natural gas versus heavy oil. As process technicians from tile companies left to start their own equipment companies, a local mach industry arose in Sassuolo. By 1970, Italian companies had emerged as world-class producers of kilns and presses; the earlier situation had exactly reversed: they were exporting their red-clay equipment for foreigners to use with white clays. The relationship between Italian tile and equipment manufacturers was a mutually supporting one, made even more so by close proximity. In the mid-1980s, there were some 200 Italian equipment manufacturers ; more than 60% were located in Sassuolo area. The equipment manufacturers competed fiercely for local business, and tile manufacturers benefited from better prices and more advanced equipment than their for rivals. As the emerging tile cluster grew and concentrated in the Sassuolo reg, a pool of skilled workers and technicians developed, including engineers, production specialists, maintenance workers, service technicians, and design personnel. The industry's geographic concentration encouraged other supporting companies to form, offering molds, packaging materials, glazes, and transportation services. An array of small, specialized consulting companies emerged to give advice to tile producers on plant design, logistics, and commercial, advertising, and fiscal matters. With its membership concentrated in the Sassuolo area, Assopiastrelle, the ceramic tile industry association, began offering services in areas of common interest: bulk purchasing, for-market research, and consulting on fiscal and legal matters. The growing tile cluster stimulated the formation of a new, specialized factor-creating institution: in 1976, a consortium of the University of Bologna, regional agencies, and the ceramic industry association founded the Centro Ceramico di Bologna, which conducted process research and product analysis. Sassuolo Home demand By the mid-1960s, per-capita tile consumption in Italy was considerably higher than in the rest of the world. The Italian market was also the world's most sophisticated. Italian customers, who were generally the first to adopt new designs and features, and Italian producers, who constantly innovated to improve manufacturing methods and create new designs, progressed in a mutually reinforcing process. The uniquely sophisticated character of domestic demand also extended to retail outlets. In the 1960s, specialized tile showrooms began opening in Italy. By 1985, there were roughly 7,600 specialized showrooms handling approximately 80% of domestic sales, far more than in other nations. In 1976, the Italian company Piemme introduced tiles by famous designers to gain distribution outlets an to build brand name awareness among consumers. This innovation drew on another related industry, design services, in which Italy was world leader, with over $10 billion in exports. Sassuolo Rivalry The sheer number of tile companies in the Sassuolo area created intense rivalry. New of product and process innovations spread rapidly, and companies seeking technological, design, and distribution leadership had to improve constantly. Proximity added a personal note to the intense rivalry. All of the producers were privately held, most family run. The owners all lived in the same area, knew each other, and were the leading citizens of the same towns. Pressures to Upgrade In the early 1970s, faced with intense domestic rivalry, pressure from retail custs, and the shock of the 1973 energy crisis, Italian tile companies struggled to reduce gas and labor costs. These efforts led to a technological breakthrough, the rapid single-firing process, in which the hardening process, material transformation, and glaze-fixing all occurred in one pass through the kiln. A process that took 225 employees using the double- firing method needed only 90 employees using single-firing roller kilns. Cycle time dropped from 16 to 20 hours to only 50 to 55 minutes. The new, smaller, and lighter equipment was also easier to export. By the early 1980s, exports from Italian equipment manufacturers exceeded domestic sales; in 1988, exports represented almost 80% of total sales. Working together, tile manufacturers and equipment manufacturers made the next important breakthrough during the mid- and late 1970s: the development of materials-handling equipment that transformed tile manufacture from a batch process to a continuous process. The innovation reduced high labor costs - which had been a substantial selective factor disadvantage facing Italian tile manufacturers. The common perception is that Italian labor costs were lower during this period than those in the United States and Germany. In those two countries, however, different jobs had widely different wages. In Italy, wages for different skill categories were compressed, and work rules constrained manufacturers from using overtime or multiple shifts. The restriction proved costly: once cool, kilns are expensive to reheat and are best run continuously. Because of the factor disadvantage, the Italian companies were the first to develop continuous, automated production. Internationalization By 1970, Italian domestic demand had matured. The stagnant Italian market led companies to step up their efforts to pursue for markets. The presence of related and supporting Italian industries helped in the export drive. Individual tile manufacturers began advertising in Italian and for home-design and architectural magazines, publications with wide global circulation among architects, designers, an consumers. This heightened awareness reinforced the quality image of Italian tiles. Tile makers were also able to capitalize on Italy's leading world export positions in related industries like marble, building stone, sinks, washbasins, furniture, lamps, and home appliances. Assopiastrelle, the industry association, established trade- promotion offices in the United States in 1980, in Germany in 1984, and in France in 1987. It organized elaborate trade shows in cities ranging from Bologna to Miami and ran sophisticated advertising. Between 1980 and 1987, the association spent roughly $8 million to promote Italian tiles in the United States. *************************************************************************