||Re: The Balkans (mind)
|| 63 sor
||The first 100 days (mind)
|| 14 sor
||Re: The first 100 days (mind)
|| 18 sor
||Re: Hungarian shield, badge size with wreath, 256 colou (mind)
|| 13 sor
||Re: The Balkans (mind)
|| 92 sor
||Re: Balkans (mind)
|| 66 sor
|+ - ||Re: The Balkans (mind)
Periodization (especially when history "began" or "ended" (e.g.
Frank Fukuyama) is a difficult business and I'll leave it to the profes-
sional historians. I think of my field, political science, as a kind of
"snapshot" while history to me seems more like a "movie". And the German
insistance (against US urging) that the EU go along and recognize Slovenia
and Croatia in the absence of *any* credible guarantees for Serb cultural
political or even social survival other than the good will of the Croat
Government was clearly a "snapshot" for disaster. After all, *all* Serbs
but especially the "mountain Serbs" remember Pavlevich and the Ustashe.
Thus what "might have been"-an EU+US+Russian joint negotiated
exit for Slovonia and Croatia was replaced by a rapid frightening exit
which properly scared the Serbs in Kraiina and in B-H since Izetbegovich's
party and personal political views did little to assuage B-H Serb fears
for their future.
Thus the German policy *was* a catalyst to the carnage in terms
of a "snapshot" which led to a considerable worsening of a bad situation.
You may argue the carnage was "inevitable" so the German action
didn't affect it much, but read Misha Glenny or Sabrina Ramet on the
diplomatic effect of Bonn's insistance and I think you may agree with me.
(The cowardice and arrogance of other western powers is another
post for we Americans and the British and French certainly don't look
any better than they did in 1935 with the Hoare-Laval sell-out of Ethio-
pia or the 1939 French-British sell-out of Czechoslovakia).
Glen D. Camp
Professor of Political Science
On Fri, 4 Nov 1994, JELIKO wrote:
> Glen Camp writes: (most deleted)
> > Thus it was German statecraft which failed under Genscher and
> > began the terrible slide into mass carnage in the heart of Europe.
> > That's what I meant by "premature."
> History, does not start with a specific current event. While the German
> policy may have been at fault, by not being coordinated with the German
> allies, it is not a single point for the failure of civility in
> On the same basis, the post WWI British and French policy can be also
> blamed for playing history with geography in countries that were obviously
> "far away little known places". Seton-Watson and fellow travelers created
> an image of Central Europe in the British political circles, that was
> highly biased and as later events proved it, very incorrect. The "creation"
> of countries by those two, both in Europe, and in all areas where as
> colonial powers they had performed in a similar manner, caused and still
> causes more deaths than anything else in recent history. I am just perusing
> the multivolume History of the WWI sponsored by the VFW and published in
> the twenties in the US. It includes many contemporary to the times
> personality's statement, correspondance, etc. It is dripping with bias and
> prejudice, the communist propaganda in 1949 to 1953 in Hungary was not as
> biased as some statements in these tomes. However, the partcular sections
> relating to what later became Yugoslavia are very intersting. How the "Hun"
> and the Hungarian prevents the people of the area from achieving their
> fondest dreams of living together and so on.
|+ - ||The first 100 days (mind)
Well, it seems that at last there was one person who decided to comment on
the new government's first one-hundred days: Mark Ellingstad. His assessment
of the government's performance is certainly more favorable than that of some
of the Hungarian papers, especially HVG, the economic weekly. Horn himself
was more critical of his government's performance than Mark.
There are two sets of important criticism levelled against the government:
(1) general reluctance to introduce necessary economic measures and (2)
ministries acting as lobbyists for different interest groups, caving in to
their demands. There is one possible explanation for all this: the
forthcoming municipal elections. Most likely the government parties don't
want to introduce unpopular measures before the elections.
|+ - ||Re: The first 100 days (mind)
> There is one possible explanation for all this: the
> forthcoming municipal elections. Most likely the government parties don't
> want to introduce unpopular measures before the elections.
Well, that definitly must be the main short term reason for
procrastinating on unpopular measures. However, there may be another
reason, too. Horn & Co. learned one important lesson form '56: keep the
bellies of Hungarians reasonably full, and then they won't care much
about politics and won't go out to the streets. There must also be that
taxi blockade of 4 years ago in the back of their mind.
We'll see after the local elections how they resolve this problem. For
they'll have to move or else: "Nem akarasnak nyoges a vege" -- as the
saying goes in Hungarian.
|+ - ||Re: Hungarian shield, badge size with wreath, 256 colou (mind)
I am sure that you meant well by posting this to the net.
However, it is not considered the best thing to do to post large non-ASCII
files to everyone, given the load they impose. Just imagine, some people
are actually paying for their incoming mail: if they have no use for your
post it is a heavy impost on them.
It might be better to broadcast a short message informing people that the
pictures are available and let them get it. THere are, by now, quite a
few Hungarian ftp sites, the owners of which would surely be happy to help
with such an enterprise.
|+ - ||Re: The Balkans (mind)
Glen Camp wrote:
>If I'm wrong, please explain why
>in analytical term rather than via hypothetical historical scenarios which
>cannot really be proved either way.
I will try, although there is only one version of past facts, however many
interpretations may be placed on them.
>I blame the Germans for making a "negotiated exit"
>by Slovenia and Croatia from the old Serb-dominated Yug. Federation a
>real possibility. The Germans forced the EU countries to go along with
>their premature recognition against US opposition. The result was 200,
>000 dead and 1.2 M refugees. This was the cost of the German policy.
> Could it have been avoided? It's not enough to argue that Slo-
>venia and Croatia were going to secede anyway.
It is not an argument, it is fact. They have been arming themselves in
anticipation of opposition by the Serbs and the JNA. They HAVE declared
>Their exit could have
>been voluntary if the West had acted and if the US had led a resolute
>opposition to chauvinist Serb political use of the JNA combined with
>tough guarantees by Tudjman and Izetbegovic for "their" Serb minori-
But it did not and has not. Quite the contrary: it is another fact that
the US supported the maintenance of x-Yugoslavia, and the rest of the West
was desperately trying to avoid doing anything upsetting the status quo.
Only the Germans were adamant that x-Yugoslavia is to be broken up, no
doubt primarily out of geopolitical considerations. They were as mistaken
as the rest of the world in thinking that international recognition of the
new states would be sufficient deterrence for the Serb nationalists. It
is a fact that it was not. However, even after the systematic bombardment of
civilian centres and the rape and concentration camps in Bosnia, Western
envoys were still trying to impress upon the Serbs to play by civilized rules.
So, this misapprehension about Serbian nationalist behaviour was not only
the Germans' fault.
>But neither leader showed any understanding of Serb fears and
>those fears were brilliantly manipulated by Milosevic and Karadjic.
The West, collectively, was just as quiet when minority rights of
Albanians and Hungarians were curtailed in Serbia, well before the
breakup. One would be excused to think that minority rights as such
were not an issue as a matter of principle, only as a matter of
avoiding antagonizing the most volatile new minority. In this I agree
with you: it would have been mush more preferable to have demanded
guarantees for the Serb minorities as a precondition of recognition
for Croatia and Bosnia. This could have been done by the US and the rest
of the West, but obviously was not. Why ? See my opinion above.
> Now I can't "prove" a negotiated exit was possible,
Now we are on hypothtical ground. I believe that every action that the
Serb nationalist have taken since the death of Tito points to the conclusion
that a negotiated breakup would not have been possible.
>but I can
>demonstrate I believe that German demands for immediate recognition of
>Slovenia and Croatia were counterproductive to a peaceful exit!
All that you have demonstrated, and I am in full agreement on that, is
that recognition without minority rights to Serbs was flawed. This does
not mean that recognition as such was flawed.
We can only hypothesize about the alternative, but I feel on strong
enough grounds on that. At the time, the alternative was not recognition
after a due process and recognition after the fulfulment of certain
conditions in minority rights. We are only talking about these things
with perfect hindsight, now. THEN, the alternative was non-recognition,
effectively confirming x-Yugoslavia as an entity. This would have been
logically followed by the crushing of the separatists by the JNA with
the fullest of Western passivity if not connivance. Given the amount
of armaments amassed by separatists this would not have been either
quick or bloodless. You make the same error as the cream of Western
dimplomats in thinking that Serb nationalists only turned beasts at a
recent point in time and they would have been tame without the irritation
of internationally-recognized Slovenian and Croatian independence.
The only game in town not aimed at the re-subjugation of the Slovenes and
Croats was the Germans'. It was flawed, in hindsight, but nobody then
suggested a better one.
I think that this thread must be getting boring for others, so I had better
scale it down. We obviously do not agree and will not convince each other.
Still, this is not reason for being nasty to each other in words or deeds.
Yes, I too enjoyed the exchange and hope to read more from you in HUNGARY
on other issues too.
|+ - ||Re: Balkans (mind)
Subject: Re: Balkans
From: Sandor Lengyel x5786,
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 1994 16:59:30 PST
In article > Sandor Lengyel
>>>this opens pandora's box, for from what i have read, the difference
>>>the serbs, croats and bosnians is essentially religion. as far as i
>>>understand matters, the common language is serbo-croatian,
>As I said, you are wrong. Croatia had a ruler long time ago.
>The USA and England, are both speak english,
it seems to me that the difference between american and english is great
to consider them as distinct but related languages, rather than simply
not only is there a divergence in spelling and vocabulary, but also
in syntax and grammar as well. in america, when i asked "how are you?",
usual response was to boast of sexual prowess rather than to tell me
about the person's
state of health and being.
the people i know who speak serbo-croatian have told me that there are,
other than the
different alphabets, very few, minor differences. since i do not speak
the language, i
am forced to rely on their comments.
>have more or less the same
i think you'll find that that is not true. i do not know how strong the
church of england is in the usa, and certainly most religious christians
i know deny the "christianity" of other
varieties of christianity. roman catholics are not notorious for their
appreciation of the various orthodox and protestant varieties of
christianity and vice versa.
>and you would not call them the same state. Australia also speaks
>As far as I go,the croats have more reason historical reason for
>as the USA or Australia.
please explain this last statement.
my point was that the reasons given for the independence of croatia from
apply all the more so to the independence of catalonia from spain, the
from spain and france, hawaii from the rest of the usa, the division of
belgium and switzerland, etc., etc. i asked whether those supporting
such a separation in the case of yugoslavia would be as enthusiastic in
the other cases.